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ABSTRACT 
The issue of the credibility of economic policies has been the topic of many 
studies since the 1970s. While the theory is quite well established, little work has so ^ 
been done on its empirical applicability. This dissertation first develops a two-game 
model; the pre-commitment game and the time consistent game to show that, in the 
absence of a pre-commitment mechanism, a government's ex-ante optimal tariflf choice 
is different fi-om its ex-post optimal choice. We show that because of the subgame 
imperfection of the pre-commitment solution, forward looking private agents, will find 
the announcement of a trade reform policy by the government at the begirming of the 
pre-commitment game, to be time inconsistent, and therefore not credible. We further 
show that a pre-commitment mechanism is required to enhance the credibility of the 
pre-commitment solution and we propose such a mechanism that could be applied in 
developing countries. 
But it is the empirical investigation of the dissertation that constitutes its real 
contribution to the literature. Indeed, using data fi'om eight Afiican countries, we 
examine whether international agreements, such as the World Bank/IMF sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programs, can serve as pre-commitment mechanisms which 
could bolster policy reforms announcements in Africa. 
The bootstrap technique is used to test for the real effects of adjustment 
ix 
agreements signed by African nations with the Bretton Woods institution on actual 
tariff policy. The results of the test show that we cannot rqect the null hypothesis that 
African governments' preconmiitment policies had an impact on their actual tariff 
policies. Further, we estimated a trade flow equation, which allowed us to examine the 
response of the private sector to the adjustment process in Africa. Using a fixed effects 
approach to panel data modeling, we are able to determine country specificity in each 
of our empirical models. 
Overall, our results show that between the pre- and post-agreements periods 
there occurred a structural break in both the tariff and the trade models. We obtain 
statistical evidence that in general, African governments adhered to the announced 
policy reforms. But, this implementation was not perfect, as reversals occurred in later 
years of adjustment in many countries. We also obtain clear evidence that the trade 
response of the private sector to the adjustment programs was positive, for the results 
show that there occurred a statistically significant increase in trade flows in the 
adjustment period. We believe that these results indicate that the private sector 
generally lent credence to policy adjustments in Africa. We conclude that programs 
such as the structural adjustment programs undertaken in Afiica in the 1980s can serve 
as pre-commitment mechanism for government policy making, but these programs 
must be developed firmly on the basis of the social, political and cultural realities of 
each country. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
There are several reasons why a government may impose tariffs on 
internationally traded goods. The usual arguments include protecting the domestic 
infant industry, national defense, anti-dumping policies, etc... regard to 
developing nations, numerous countries had pursued import substitution policies in the 
1950s and 1960s, the general objective of which was to decrease the dependency of 
the concerned nations on foreign made goods by spurring growth in the import-
competing sector. The usual policy actions included the imposition of various price 
and quantity restrictions on foreign imports in order to reduce competition with the 
domestic import sector. 
However, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was apparent that although high 
protective tariffs and quotas did limit imports, the decline in demand for foreign 
exchange that resulted from these policies led to an appreciation of the domestic 
currency, and thus a heavy tax on exports. In addition, duties on intermediate goods 
implied a tax on export activities using these intermediate goods. In Turkey, for 
example, during the protective years of the 1970s imports were growing at a rate of 
2% per year, whereas, exports were actually declining at 1% per year. In contrast, 
during the liberal years of 1979-1989, Turkish imports grew by 10.4%, while its 
exports grew by 19.2%. (Dombusch, 1992). All in all, under import substitution 
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policies, developing countries saw a decline in the competitiveness of their export 
goods, and overvaluation of their currencies; they suffered severe balance of payments 
problems, and accumulated large amounts of foreign debt. 
This economic crisis meant that, in most cases, international credit was 
curtailed or cut off for these countries, and in some cases (as was the case for Cote 
dlvoire), the debt service to exports ratio escalated above 400% in 1989, according to 
World Bank figures. In an attempt to address the economic crisis they were facing, 
several countries signed economic agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s. Almost invariably, these structural adjustment programs 
called for, inter alia, the liberalization of the concerned country's trade regime. 
But, is the announcement of a trade liberalization as part of an agreement 
sufficient to ensure a welfare increasing response from the private sector? This is the 
main issue studied in this paper. The paper establishes that while it is always in the 
interest of a government to pre-commit, ex ante, to a policy such as trade 
liberalization, this policy may be time inconsistent ex post, and it would therefore not 
be credible to private agents, unless there exists an irreversible mechanism to support 
the announced policy. 
After presenting a review of the literature on time inconsistency of policies, we 
develop two models: the time consistency model and the pre-commitment model to 
discuss the issue of time inconsistency of government policies. Next, we propose an 
example of a pre-commitment mechanism that may aid governments in their 
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relationship with private agents. Finally, under the assumption that Structural 
Adjustment Programs could play the role of a pre-commitment mechanism in the 
African context, we present an empirical study that tests if the tariff policy reforms 
announced as part of the adjustment programs agreed to by African governments in 
the 1980s had any real effect on the government tariff policy rule and the production 
and trade behavior of private agents in Africa. 
1.2 A Review of the Literature 
1.2.1 On the Theory of Credibility 
In their seminal articles, Kydland and Prescott (1977^, and Calvo (1978), 
developed the theory of the credibility of economic policies. In particular, Kydland and 
Prescott discussed the importance of credibility with respect to inflation-reduction 
policies. Suppose that the monetary authorities of a country wanted to put in place a 
stabilization program, the objectives of which are to reduce inflation and eliminate 
unemployment. Under the traditional Phillips curve's assiraiptions, these objectives are 
contradictory. Suppose that at the beginning of time t, the monetary authorities 
announced a strategy of zero inflation. As long as this announcement is credible to 
private agents, the authorities have a discretionary control over unemployment 
reduction. Thus, in the absence of a binding, pre-commitment mechanism, the 
monetary authorities have a great incentive to renege on their announced policy. This 
is to say that, once the private sector has chosen a strategy consistent with the zero 
inflation policy, the monetary authorities can make a surprise move by keeping to a 
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positive inflation policy, thereby fully exploiting a potential Phillips curve relationship. 
Of course, rational private agents can see through the authorities' smokescreen, and 
>vill determine that the latter's announcement of a zero inflation policy is time 
inconsistent and therefore not credible. 
Further theoretical discussions on the dynamic (time) inconsistency of policy 
reforms are the focus of Lapan (1988^ for large country application; Hillier and 
Malcomson (1984), Fischer (1980), Tesfatsion (1984), and Tesfatsion (1986). Indeed, 
in his 1980 article in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (JEDC), Fischer 
raised the issue of time consistency as it pertains to the type of control policy the 
government has at its disposal. According to Fischer, the problem of dynamic 
inconsistency arises when the government does not have a "non-distortionary control 
instrument (i.e., lump sum tax or transfer) at its disposal" and when current private 
agents' decisions take into account their expectations of future policy variables. 
However, in a two-period model, Hillier and Malcomson (1984), show that lump-sum 
tax is not necessary nor sufficient to achieve dynamic consistency. The Hillier and 
Malcomson paper consisted of three models. The first is a two-period model 
composed of a private sector and a public sector. There is a large number of 
individuals in the private sector who are assimied to have perfect foresight. The 
authors show that an optimal open-loop policy for the economy is dynamically 
consistent, if the government has sufficient policy instruments to control period one 
prices. The second and third models used by KUier and Malcomson consist of an 
5 
exchange economy, with a public good present in the former, and a consumption 
externality in the latter, and two types of individuals in both models. Both models are 
used to show that the absence of distortionary tax/transfers is not necessary to achieve 
dynamic consistency. 
Similar findings were made in Tes£itsion (1984b) and Tesfatsion (1986). The 
former extends the Fischer model to include a firm sector. The latter develops 
necessary and sufBcient conditions for a dynamic Walrasian economy to exhibit 
inconsistency. In both papers, the author shows that reliance on non-distortionary 
policies is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve consistency in government 
policies. 
1.2.2 On the Application of the Theory of Credibility to Trade Policies 
With respect to the application of the problem of time inconsistency to trade, 
Lapan (1988) discusses the issue as it relates to time lags, and the sequence in which 
decisions are made. Indeed, the two-good, two-country (one of them large) model, 
focuses on the timing of decisions and shows that when the domestic govenmient has 
the ability to revise a policy that it has announced, then the announcement is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, the government has an incentive ex post to increase the tariff above its ex 
ante level, and the optimal policy is time inconsistent. To remedy this problem, the 
author suggests that an irrevocable pre-commitment mechanism, either through 
legislation or treaty, is necessary for the goverrmient to establish and maintain 
credibility. 
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Other models in the literature do not rely so much on the dynamic 
inconsistency of policies, but on ad hoc assignment of a belief structure to agents. For 
example, Aizenman (1992) proposes a model that analyzes the effects of trade 
liberalization on investment and development in a situation where the credibility of the 
reformer is in doubt. The model put forth by Aizenman has the following general 
features. The economy is a dual sector producing outputs X and Y, using both private 
and public investments. The country is assumed to have comparative advantage in the 
production of X. The representative agent maximizes the value of his expected lifetime 
utility function, and the country has access to the international credit market. 
However, the degree of accessibility is restricted by the perceived openness of the 
country, which can be measured by the ability and willingness of the country to service 
its debt. A country that will default on its external debt will face a penalty. 
This is a two-period model, where in period 1 the policy makers liberalize trade 
by eliminating tariffs and other trade impediments. However, the public only attaches a 
probability (p) to the possibility that the trade reform will succeed, and therefore a 
probability (1-p) to the possibility that it will M. The probability of success, p, is 
affected by the profile of government investment. The author assumes that the greater 
the public investment in the X sector (the export sector), the greater the cost of 
reneging on the policy, therefore the higher the probability of success. Conversely, if a 
higher proportion of government investment is done in the import competing sector, 
then the probability of failure of govenraient policies as perceived by agents would be 
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higher. Thus, to enhance its credibility, the paper suggests that the government should 
tilt its investment profile towards the export sector. The extreme form of this type of 
pre-commitment mechanism was suggested in Srivastava (1994^, where the author 
reconmiended that to achieve credibility in trade liberalization, a government should 
nationalize the export sector of the country. 
With respect to the operational reasons why credibility problems may arise in 
an economy, Rodrik (1989a) suggests that the possibility of inconsistency between a 
trade reform, for example, and other policies pursued simultaneously by the 
government may cause the private sector to doubt government policy. Secondly, there 
may exist a time inconsistency problem, meaning that it is possible that the government 
has an interest to adopt a strategy ex post which would be different fi'om its ex ante 
strategy (see discussions above). This means that, pursuant to a policy reform, once 
the private sector has made the expected adjustments, it may not be very costly for the 
government to reverse its policies. Finally, there may exist incomplete or asymmetric 
information in the economy. In this case the private sector may not be able to 
determine the true type of a government. It may not be able to distinguish between a 
government committed to true trade reform, and one that is just enacting reform 
policies in order to conform to conditionality requirements necessary to receive foreign 
aid. Thus private agents may not be able to tell how committed the government is to 
reform. In this situation, in order to achieve credibility, the government needs to signal 
its true type. According to Rodrik (1989b), "the rate at which the reform is introduced 
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may serve to convey the government's future intention and hence as a signal of its 
type"' (p 758). 
While the present research presents the time inconsistency (and therefore the 
credibility) problem by focusing on the sequence of decisions, it distinguishes itself 
from earlier discussions in two ways; first, we propose a simple, and achievable 
mechanism, to support a pre-commitment optimal policy. The government is not 
required to modify its actions, but rather ex ante, it must credibly pre-commit to its a 
tariff policy. We derive the necessary condition under which the government would 
agree to the proposed mechanism. The second contribution of the paper consists in the 
development and estimation of two econometric models to analyze the effect of the 
trade liberalization provisions of actual agreements signed by African governments in 
an attempt to spur their trade sector in Africa. We assume that the lack of credibility 
may be one of the reasons behind the poor performance of the trade sector, and we 
test whether the tariff agreements can serve as a vehicle to establish credibility. The 
theoretical model is presented in the next section. 
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2. THE CREDIBHJTY OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
ANNOUNCEMENTS UNDER TWO MODELS: THE PRE-COMMTTMENT 
MODEL AND THE TIME CONSISTENT MODEL 
2.1 Overview 
The theoretical discussion of the credibility problem is carried out in this 
dissertation under two types of games (or models); the pre-commitment game and the 
time consistent game, played (possibly) infinitely, but with the same games played in 
each, isolated time period. We do not allow government's reputation from preceding 
periods to effect plans in any current period; and there is no linkage between periods 
through savings, or lending (and borrowing). The issue of time inconsistency arises 
thus, not from any dynamics in the model, but from the sequence in which each game 
is played. In the next section, we present a sketch of the economy. Subsequent 
sections discuss the solutions to the two models. 
2.2 The Economy 
Consider a small, open economy which produces, in each period, two types of 
tradable goods; Qm, the importable, and Q*, the exportable. The economy exports all 
of its output of Ox, and uses the revenue to purchase the additional amount of the 
importable good necessary to satisfy the domestic demand of Qm. The economy 
comprises three sectors; a production sector; a consumer (or household) sector; and 
the government. There are H numbers of households in the economy. The firms in the 
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production sector are owned by the households. Each agent feces a utility function 11** 
which is a function of a private consumption good, as well as a public good provided 
by the government. Agents are assumed to behave non-cooperatively. Thus, each 
private agent in each sector makes his/her decision treating everybody else's decisions 
as given. Therefore, with a large enough number of agents in each sector, any 
individual agent's decision will have only infinitesimal effect on other agents' behavior. 
We also make the assumption, as in Fischer (1980), that agents are forward-looking, 
that they form beliefs or expectations about government policy, and that these 
expectations coincide with the actual government policy. Thus, agents have rational 
expectations, or even perfect foresight, since there exists no uncertainty in the model. 
We further make the assumption of full-information in this economy. Also, the 
economy starts each period with an endowment of a fixed resource, which we call Et. 
The objective of each household is to maximize its utility; and the government 
is benevolent and uses its policy choices to maximize a social welfare function, to be 
specified. We ignore factor market decisions in our analysis. The import good is the 
numeraire in this economy, such that, at each time, its price is set to equal to 1. 
The government imposes a tariff (tax) on the exportable good in each period t. 
Thus, letting the world relative price of the export good (taken by the economy as 
given) in period t to be denoted by P",, and zj to denote the tariff rate in period t, the 
domestic relative price of the export good is found as: 
11 
(1) 
2.3 Agents' Decisions 
23.1 Decisions in the Private Sector 
In each period, and for each agent, the production possibility frontier is given 
for h=l.. .H, where h denotes individual households. 
In equation (2), g, the transformation function for each agent is a decreasing, 
concave fimction of and it is a fimction of each agent's endowment of the fixed 
resource in time t. 
Also, let Gt denote the public good provided by the government in each period 
t; and denote total private consumption of good M by each household in period t. 
Then, we represent the utility faced by each household in each period as; 
We assume ift to be at least twice continuously diflferentiable, positively increasing in 
its arguments, and strictly concave in all its arguments. 
Since all of the domestic production of Qm is consumed at home, and 
additional demand is fliljGlled with the importation of Qm, we represent private 
consumption as: 
by: 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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Equation (4) is the budget constraint of each agent, expressed in terms of the 
numeraire price. It also models the import good as a perfect substitute for the 
domestic importable good. 
In each period, the public good is created by the government through the 
aggregate tariff revenue that it collects. The import good is transformed into the public 
good on one-to-one basis. Thus, we represent Gt as: 
for j=I...H, h=l...H. 
The objective of each household is to choose the optimal output supply of the 
export good to maximize (6). However, the precise method of maximization will 
depend on the sequence of decisions appropriate to each game. 
2.3.2 Goverament's Decisions 
The objective of this benevolent government is to maximize a social welfare 
fimction, which we designate by W. A general representation of the welfare function is 
that it is function (i|/) of the utility functions of all the agents in the society. Thui, we 
can represent the welfare fimction generally, as: 
(5) 
b 
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3), we get: 
(7) 
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However, more specifically, we represent the social welfare function as additive in the 
private utility functions, taking the form; 
u;{cl;a,). (8) 
b 
where is the weight accorded to each agent's utility. For simplicity, we assume that 
A'=...= A« = 1. 
The welfare function in (8) is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. This is 
achieved by the assumption that each of the component utility functions is strictly 
concave. The government's objective can now be expressed as choosing the best tariff 
to maximize (8). But, again the methods of maximization, and its solutions, will 
depend on the sequence in which the two games are played. 
2.4 Solution Methods 
2.4.1 An Excursion on Optimum Control Theory 
In optimum control theory, open- and closed-loop solutions can be explained 
as follows. Suppose that the control law of ^Markov model is derived as:^ 
u, = i{x„t) (9) 
Since Ut in equation (9) depends on the current state, it is known as a feedback 
or closed-loop control. However, if we can solve for x, and u, in terms of an initial 
condition xo, then (9) becomes: 
1. See. Whittle, 1982, p 57 
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u, = u{x^,t) (10) 
Equation (10) expresses control as an open-loop, because, in the words of 
Whittle, "actions are determined by the clock rather than by the current state" (p 57). 
As Whittle points out, "the closed-loop form has a potential adaptivity to changing 
circimistances which the open-loop form lacks" (p 57). These notions of optimimi 
control theory will guide the solution methods we present below. 
We will now discuss the precommitment (or open-loop) and time consistent 
(or closed-loop) solutions to our model. For this analysis, we will suppress the time 
subscript, since the solution forms will be the same for each period. 
2.4.2 The Precommitment Solution 
As we have noted above, the discussion of the solutions to each model will 
assume a given sequence of decisions. For the precommitment solution, decisions are 
made in the following sequence; (i) in the first stage, the government announces a 
precommitment tariff rate, r^; (ii) in the second stage, production decisions are made, 
based on the announced tariff; (iii) in the third stage, consumption decisions are made. 
2.4.2.1 Private Agents' Decisions 
The pre-commitment game assumes that the aimouncement of is believed 
by private agents, and is irrevocable by the government. The household's problem then 
becomes; 
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(11) 
Using baclcward induction (or Bellman's Optimality Principle), we first determine 
each household's optimum choice as the solution to the following first order necessary 
and sufiBcient conditions (we assume throughout that second order conditions hold); 
+ =0 (12) 
The solution to equation (12) is the household's optimum choice of Q*, which we 
denote by Q^. We represent this optimum choice as; 
= (13) 
where, (g;...(3?}; j« h, and h=l...H. 
For each household, the optimum solution in equation (13) depends on the 
precommitment tariff and the output of all other agents, with each household taking as 
given the choice of all other agents. A simultaneous solution to (13) for all agents 
gives rise to the reduced form solution; 
= ^(r') (14) 
Thus, when each private agent determines his/her optimum choice, the solution 
takes as given the choices of all other agents. However, when the government solves 
(12) simultaneously for all agents, the solution for the typical household depends on 
the precommitment tariff only. 
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2.4.2.2 The Optinud Solution Set for the Pre-commitment Game 
Given (14), the government now makes the optimum selection of its policy to 
maximize the welfare fimction (8), subject to the government constraint (5). 
Substituting (5) and (6) into (8), we represent the govenmient's problem as; 
M a x  . W = y I f  
Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to t, we obtain: 
d W  
dr 
ui'-p'!.-
ST 
= 0 
However, since from (12), we have: 
6!'[^'(Q;;£')+(1 - T)P-\ = 
Then, substituting (17) into equation (16) we obtain: 
3 W  
3x 
=2 
( \ 
+ U^tP^ 
\ 1 8 x  3 x  
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
= 0 (18) 
For simplicity we can transform this model into a representative agent one. 
This is accomplished by assuming that all agents have identical utility functions, 
technology, and endowments. Therefore, the solution (not necessarily the individual 
action at any particular time) to the optimization problem (8) is the same for all agents. 
Under this assumption, equation (12) becomes: 
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^=U\g(Q^.e)+(\-r)P'Y = 0 (19) 
where, we have dropped the superscript h. 
Further, since all agents are assumed to be alike, we can rewrite equation (18) 
as; 
where H is the total number of private agents. Finally, equation (20), can be 
represented in elasticity form as: 
Note that there are H numbers of equations of type (19) representing the 
private conditions, and one equation of type (21) representing government conditions. 
Using these (H+1) equations, we derive the set of equilibrium solutions to the 
precommitment model as; 
In (22), the tariff rate represents the pre-commitment tariff that the 
government announces at the beginning of the pre-commitment game. 
We present some additional remarks at this point. In the absence of any 
distortion associated with the provision of the public good G, the government's first 
best solution for welfare maximization is to set the sum of the marginal rate of 
substitution equal to the marginal rate of transformation. In our model, given that the 
oz ox 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
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marginal rate of transformation is equal to one, this implies that the first best solution 
is achieved when the following holds; 
^ = 1 (23) 
U, 
If we further assume that there is a single agent in the economy, i.e., that H=l, 
then (21) reduces to the following; 
IV 
^=p-[i4-y,]=o (24) 
And from (24) the first best solution with a single agent becomes: 
-^ = 1 (25) 
To understand the importance of this analysis, we arrange condition (12) to 
obtain; 
+ = (26) 
which, from (24) implies, 
= 0 (27) 
Equation (27) is the first order condition for utility maximization for an 
mdividual household in an economy without distortion. Thus, in the contejct of an 
economy composed of a single private agent, and a benevolent government, the tariff 
would not be distortionary [as is clear from (25) and (26)], since all tarifiF revenues will 
be rebated to that agent in the form of a public good provided by the government. 
Hence, the issue of time consistency will not arise. 
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However, in the present model, there are H>1 number of agents, and the 
resufts are different. Indeed, with H>1, and assuming —— < 0, then the first best 
dx 
solution derived fi'om (23) fails to hold, and the solution to (20) implies that; 
^^>1, (28) 
U, 
Thus, due to the responsiveness of export supply to changes in the tariff, there is an 
under-provision of the public good in the pre-commitment game. Further, unlike the 
case of a single agent, when H>1, the first order condition for utility maximization in 
(27) is no longer valid. This is because, with H>1, (24) does not obtain, and equation 
(27) becomes; 
u\g(Q,-.e)+P^]*0 (29) 
The implication of this discussion is that with many private agents who do not 
cooperate in their decisions, the imposition of a tariff will be distortionary, because the 
tariff affects output decisions. The issue is that the private sector is not certain that the 
value of the marginal benefit received by each agent in terms of the public good, is 
equal to his/her marginal contribution. There is a potential fi-ee-rider problem and the 
issue of inconsistency of policies becomes relevant in this situation. 
2.4.3 The Time Consistent Game 
Now, in the absence of a pre-commitment mechanism, forward-looking private 
agents recognize that once their production decisions have been made in response to 
the announcement of (22), the government may have an ex-post incentive to change its 
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policy. As we will show, once private decisions have been made, the export supply 
becomes inelastic, and the government therefore has an incentive to impose a higher 
tanSexpost, unless it can be prohibited from doing so. Thus, the policy implied by 
(22) is not time consistent, and is therefore not credible to private agents. The only 
credible policy, in the absence of a commitment mechanism, is the time consistent 
policy, since it is the subgame perfect solution to this problem. We now present the 
time consistent game. 
For the time consistent (TC) game, the sequence of decisions are different from 
the ones for the precommitment game. Agents move as follows; (i) in the first stage, 
private agents make their optimal output selection; (ii) in the second stage, the 
government selects its optimal policy, based on private decisions in the first stage; (iii) 
finally, based on stages (i) and (ii), consumption decisions and the choice of the public 
good are made. 
2.4.3.1 The Government's Solution 
Once again, we use Bellman's Optimality Principle to select, first, the 
government's policy, and then, based on this policy, we select private actions. We use 
to underscore the fact when the government makes its policy selection, private 
decisions, from the perspective of the government, are predetermined. 
The government's problem is, therefore, to maximize a restricted welfare 
fimction, say, W, that takes the form; 
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Once again, assuming all A ^ = 1, and taking the derivative of (30), then the 
first order conditions become; 
Notice that, in contrast to (18), equation (31) does not involve terms relating to the 
responsiveness of export supply to tariflf. In fact, in the TC game, export supply is not 
responsive to tariJff changes. There is no distortion associated with the provision of the 
public good via tariiff, and the government has no incentive to reduce tariflf. Further, 
since fi-om (31) the sununed marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation, equation (32) is the first best solution for each individual, if all 
agents select the same output supply, Q^. 
2.4.3.2 Equilibrium in the Time Consistent Game 
Given (32), private agents derive the optimal output choice by solving the 
following problem: 
In (33), each agent recognizes that the tariflf responds to changes in his/her own output 
4^=2 =0 
dr _ y . 
(31) 
The solution to (31) is: 
(32) 
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choices, but he/she treats all other agents' output as given. The first order conditions 
are; 
dlf 
= tf[j?+(l-r)/^]+C4P'r' + dr 
eat 
= 0 (34) 
There are H equations of the form (34) and one government condition of the form 
(31). Solving these (H+1) equations yields the TC solution. 
But, once again, we simplify the model by assuming that the solution (34) is 
identical for all agents. Under this assumption, equations (31) and (34) become; 
dW 
dx 
=(mj^-u,)P'Q,=o, (35) 
which is the condition that solves for the government's optimal instrument. 
And, 
DU 
= [u,[g^\-T)r] + T {HU^-U,)P-Q^ dx = 0, (36) 
which is the household's condition. By the envelope theorem, (35) and (36), yield: 
[u\g^l-T)P~] + z-p'U^ = 0 (37) 
The set of solutions to (36) and (37) is; 
(38) 
which is the Nash equilibrium solution for the time consistent game. 
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2.5 Comparing the Time Consistent and Pre-commitment Solutions 
We put forth the following propositions to analyze the time consistent and pre-
commitment solutions. 
Proposition 1 
The precommitment and time consistent solutions will coincide only if, in the 
precommitment game, the supply elasticity of the good Qx is equal to zero. 
Proof of Proposition I: 
A comparison of the pair of equations (35) and (37) to the pair (19) and (20) 
reveals that: a) for both the time consistent and precommitment solutions, the first 
order conditions corresponding to the private agents' problem are the same. That is, 
condition (37) is the same as condition (19); b) however, for the government's 
problem, the first order conditions are not the same. When evaluated at the same tariff 
rate, (21) differs fi^om (35) by the second batch of terms in (21), which are: 
f ^ 
(39) 
- Qcy 
The terms (39), represent the aggregate change in the private utility fiinction 
with respect to a change in the public good times the responsiveness (or elasticity) of 
the supply of good Qx to a change in tariff. Since we have no a priori reason to believe 
that P''UQ{H- l) = 0, then the two sohitions will coincide only if 
Q.E.D. 
dT Q 
= 0. 
X J 
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But, the equality between the time consistent and precommitment solutions is a 
trivial case in our analysis. The more interesting case arises when the two solutions are 
not the same. This is discussed through the following proposition. 
Pn^Msition 2: 
Thepre-commitment tariff, r' is less than the time consistent tariff, t'O-e., 
dx 
Proof of Pn^wsiHon 2: 
Compare the conditions [(35) and (37)] to [(19) and (20)]. When evaluated at 
the same tariff rate, equations (19) and (37) are the same and they are used to solve 
for the output QX(T). Now, assume-^^ <0.^ Then, evaluating (20) at the TC tariff. 
We also provide a graphical explanation of Proposition 2. Consider the 
following general representation of the first order conditions (35) and (37), as loci of 
points under the TC game. 
dr 
(^W 
we obtain: 1 ^ <0. If ^-lt' <0, then < t". Q.E.D. 
dr ' dt 
(40) 
denotes the private agent's locus; and. 
(41) 
denotes the government's locus. 
2. For proof see ^ )pendix A 
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Similarly, for the PC game, we represent (19) and (20) as: 
•/(a.r)=o. (42) 
the private agent's locus (same function as (40)); and. 
7(Q,.r) = /i:((2,r)+4Q,.r) = 0, (43) 
the government locus, with 2[Q^,r) <0. 
Assume, 7^ <0, <0, TQ <0 and KQ^ <0. Then, consider Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Comparing the time consistent and pre-commitment solutions. 
At point (a) we provide the graphical representation of the TC solution, where 
the TC private and government loci intersect. Now, since the Z function in (43) is 
negative, the PC government locus lies below the TC government locus. We then 
show, at point (b), the tariff rate, that would prevail if we evaluate the PC solution 
at the TC output level. This is the optimum tariff level selected by the government if all 
O-
.X 
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agents choose the time consistent level of output.. Point (c) represents the PC 
solution. As the graph shows, the solution that generates the lowest tariff rate and the 
highest output level is the pre-commitment solution. 
One explanation for this result is that, in the case of the pre-conunitment game, 
the private agent can modify his/her decision in response to an increase in tariff. Thus, 
in setting its policy, the government must take into account the private agents' 
reaction, to changes in the tariff policy. However, for the time consistent game, the 
government does not have to consider such a response from the private sector, since 
the elasticity of supply, in that case is zero. 
We offer an alternative explanation to understand Proposition 2. In the 
standard analysis of the incidence of tax on private agents, it can be shown that the 
level of taxation that government can impose may depend on the responsiveness (or 
elasticity) of the offer curve of the group being taxed. Further, according to the 
LeChatelier Principle, "the long-run supply response to a change in price is at least as 
large as the short-run supply response", when evaluated at the same price level 
(Varian; 1992, p 47). We can think of the domestic export supply curve for the pre-
commitment game as the long run (or ex-ante) export supply curve, and the export 
supply for the time consistent game, as the short run (or ex-post) export supply curve. 
From the LeChatelier Principle, we know that the elasticity of the ex-ante export 
supply curve is at least as large as that of the ex-post one. Thus, the tariff imposed by 
the government would be different depending on whether it is faced with the ex-ante 
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(long run) export offer curve, or the ex-post (short run) export offer curve. In fact, by 
Proposition 2, the short run tariff would be higher than the long run one. 
Pnqmsition 3: 
The time consistent solution is dominated by the pre-commitment solution. 
Proof of Prt^ osition 3: 
Let W be the welfare function resulting from the pre-commitment choices, 
and W be the welfare function resulting from the time consistent choices. At the same 
/ \ / \ tariff rate, say, r", we have: . However, if ^ ^ 0, then 
/ \ . Max^ W > W{ r"). More particularly, following Proposition 2, if 1 , < 0, 
^ ' dv 
then x'' < t", and Max^ W > Q.E.D. 
The issue raised in Proposition 3 is really one of policy options available to the 
government in its policy choice set. When the government selects the pre-commitment 
policy, the time consistent policy remains an option. If at the beginning of a game, a 
welfare maximizing government chooses to announce the pre-commitment policy, then 
this implies that the welfare benefit it expects to receive from announcing such a policy 
must be greater than the expected benefit from the alternative time consistent policy. 
But, the question to be posed regards whether or not the government has the ability to 
change its announced policy, ex post, i.e., once the private sector has made its output 
selection. This points to the issue of credibility that will be raised in the next 
proposition. 
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Proptmtion 4: 
In the absence of an irrevocable pre-commitment mechanism, the 
government's policy announcement of the optimal precommitment tariff is not 
credible to private agents. 
Proof of Proposition 4 : 
Lapan (1988^1 and Srivastava (1994) have made similar propositions. In this 
paper, it is sufiBcient to note that the PC game is subgame imperfect (see Kreps, 1990). 
Therefore, assuming the government could subsequently modify the actual tariff, any 
move announced by the government at the beginning of the PC game other than the 
time consistent tariff, would not be credible to private players. Credibility can only be 
established by an irreversible mechanism that supports the government's announced 
move. Q.E.D. 
Note that the problem of credibility does not arise from a malicious motive on 
the part of the government. Rather, by its very nature, the pre-commitment game has 
an intrinsic credibility problem, because of other options (the ability to change tariffs) 
available to the government once the private sector has "locked in" its action. In the 
next section, we provide an example of a pre-commitment mechanism which could 
help to support the pre-commitment solution. 
2.6 An Example of a Pre-commitment Mechanism 
Assume (for simplicity) that there is an outside institution (IMF, World Bank, 
etc...) that has a sunilar objective function as the government. Further, suppose that in 
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order to help the government to maintain its credibility, the institution presents it with 
the following proposition; 
(a) If the government maintains its announced tariff policy then it will receive 
a benefit of size, say, 0 (expressible in utils), from the institution; 
(b) but, if the government signs the agreement and fails to maintain its 
precommitment policy, then it loses access to the tranter payment from the 
institution, and, in addition, pays a penalty of size e>0 (also, expressible in 
utils), to the institution. 
We now derive the conditions under which the government will enter this agreement, 
and which will make the pre-commitment policy credible. 
Let designate the production level selected by the private sector when the 
pre-commitment policy is credible. Given Q^, the restricted welfare function can be 
expressed as: W=^r, . Also, let ^[r, represent the net welfare attained by 
the government under the agreement, and PT' as the time consistent welfere level 
(derived earlier). Then, we formalize the agreement conditions (a) and (b) as: 
if (44) 
and, 
ift=t'' (45) 
The decision to enter into the agreement depends on the net welfare anticipated under 
the agreement. From (44) and (45), if the sum of the benefit of compliance plus the 
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cost of reneging is such that; 
(P+e)<[Max,^f ,<?,(r'))]- [H(r',(3,(r'))]. (46) 
meaning that the net benefit anticipated if the government reneges on the agreement is 
higher than the net benefit anticipated if it complies, then the announcement of the pre-
commitment solution under the agreement would not be credible. Private agents will 
expect the government to renege on r''; hence they will not choose Q, = QSJ'') 
Further, if the government enters into the agreement, with (46) prevailing, then the net 
welfare to the economy is ^ (since under this condition, the private sector would 
produce And, if the government does not enter into the agreement, the 
economy's welfare remains at The welfare ranking for this case is then: 
W^{do not enter) > [ - e^enterand renege), and the government is better off not 
to sign the agreement. 
However, suppose the inequality in (46) is reversed, then we would have: 
In (47), the net benefit anticipated fi'om compliance is greater than the net benefit 
anticipated from non-compliance; the announcement of the pre-commitment solution is 
credible under the agreement, and the government is better off signing the agreement. 
Thus, assuming no exogenous uncertainty, equation (47) is a necessary condition for 
the government to sign the agreement. 
(47) 
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We have shown that, if appropriately formulated, ati international agreement 
such as the one we propose, may serve two purposes; to enhance the welfare of the 
society, and to act as a precommitment mechanism that would bolster the credibility of 
the government from the point of view of private agents. Our is only one of many 
possible pre-commitment mechanisms. Other mechanisms may include, in a democratic 
society for example, constitutional requirements that may prohibit present and future 
governments from altering a pre-commitment policy. 
We also note that our proposal for a pre-commitment mechanism is an 
approximation of part of the conditions African (and other developing) countries had 
to fulfill when they signed the IMF/World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs).^ Among other reforms, these programs required countries to 
remove barriers to trade, reduce their tariffs, devalue their exchange rates, and 
rationalize government expenditure. 
In the next section, we attempt to determine, using data from African 
countries, whether the announcement of this type of international agreements affected 
the behavior of private agents in Africa. We do not attempt to measure credibility per 
se, but rather we wish to determine whether trade reforms in the SAP agreements have 
a measurable impact on actual government policies, and private plans and actions. If 
we do find that the aimouncements made as part of S APs had significant impacts on 
private actions and plans, then we might be able to infer that private agents found 
3. See Kanbur (1991) for a discussion of the theory of structural adjustment and the role of trade policy. 
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government announcement to be credible. Now, we turn to the empirical section of 
our paper. 
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3. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE REFORMS ON 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PRIVATE ACTIONS IN AFRICA 
In this section, we study the impact of the structural adjustment programs on 
government tariflF policy making, and private sector decisions in Africa. We will first 
present a brief account of country specific evidence on the reform programs. Then, we 
review the body of work concerning the empirical modeling of credibility. Next, we 
present the model we propose to conduct our empirical investigation; finally, the 
results of our model are presented and discussed. 
3.1 An Overview of the Recent Developments in Africa 
Our model will attempt to capture the historical economic development that 
has occurred in most African countries since they achieved independence from colonial 
powers in the early 1960s. The inmiediate post-independence period (1960-1970) was 
marred with political turbulence, as newly created nations were attempting to discover 
their development paths. During this period, nations had not yet created an atmosphere 
(infrastructure, political stability, an established credit market, and other incentives) 
conducive to increased private (domestic as well as foreign) investment. However, 
during the decade of the 1970s Afiican countries became more or less fully integrated 
into the world market. Many Afiican countries such as Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Zaire, 
South Afiica, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, became premier producers of mostly 
primary and mineral products, such as cocoa, coflFee, lumber, oil, diamonds, gold. 
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etc.... By the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s Africa began to experience a 
period of severe and lingering economic crisis. Indeed, during 1980-1989, several 
countries experienced a negative growth rate in their GDP: in Nigeria, the rate was -
0.4; in Niger it was -1.6, and in Mozambique it was -1.4. (World Development Report. 
1991) In order to remedy this situation, African countries began to look for help from 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. Thus, began the period of the so-called structural 
adjustment in many African countries. 
The empirical justification for our two-period model lies then, in the fact that 
since Independence, we can identify two main periods characterized by major shifts in 
economic policy-making in Africa; the period pre-Structural Adjustment Programs 
(S APs), where countries followed (more or less) their own economic paths, without a 
given structure for economic policy choice agreed to with an outside agency; and the 
period post-SAPs where countries have agreed to follow a set of conditions, including 
the making of economic policy choice, in exchange for increased foreign aid. 
3.2. The Empirical Evidence on Reform Programs in Eight African Countries 
This section presents country case studies on the adjustment process in eight 
African nations. These countries were selected because they are the ones for which we 
are able to obtain the data that we require for our analysis. 
35 
3.2.1 Cote d'lvoire 
3.2.1.1 Main Features of the Economy 
The Republic of Cote d'lvoire gained independence from France in August 
1960. The country covers an area of 322,463 sq. km. and has a population of 14 
million inhabitants that is growing at approximately 3.8 annually. Between 1965 and 
1980, the economy was growing at a high rate of 6% to 8%, but from 1981 onwards, 
the country suffered from severe economic crises due to both internal (macroeconomic 
imbalances) and external forces (such as a slump in the terms of trade). 
Figure 2 displays the performance of the country's GDP from 1970. As the 
figure shows, after growing at a higher than average rate during most of 1970s, the 
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Figure 2. Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP in Cote d'lvoire 
since 1970 
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growth rate of GDP was negative from the early 1980s onwards, and the country has 
not recovered since. The balance of payments presents a grim picture of the 
economy's performance since 1975. The current account balance is shown in Figure 3. 
The figure shows that the Ivorian current account has consistently posted a negative 
balance since 1975. This negative balance in the current is driven mostly driven by the 
persistent negative balance in the trade account. 
Figure 4 depicts Cote d'lvoire's balance of trade since 1970. The persistently 
poor performance in the country's balance of payments is indicative of underlying 
structural problems. One of the most important factors in the development of the 
Ivorian economy is foreign direct investment. Figure 5 depicts how foreign 
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Figure 3. Cote d'lvoire's Current Account Balance 
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Figure 5. Direct Foreign Investment in Cote d'lvoire since 1970 
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direct investment (in million of $) has changed over the last two decades in the 
country. As the figure shows, foreign direct investment in Cote d'lvoire has gone up 
and down over the past two decades, but more particularly, in some years in the mid 
to late 1980s foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country became almost non-
existant. From Figure 5 and Figure 2, we observe that during the years when the 
Ivorian FDI declines heavily, the country's GDP worsens also. Now, we provide 
details as to how the economic situation led to the adoption of adjustment programs in 
Cote d'lvoire (see Figure 6 for the relationship between the Ivorian terms of trade and 
its exports). 
With an average annual growth rate of 8% during the period of 1965-75, Cote 
d'lvoire had been branded as a success story in Afiica. However, this characterization 
began to change from the mid-1970s. In 1976, a production slump in Brazil resulted in 
a boom in export prices of cocoa and coffee (the country's main export crops). 
Expecting this increase in world prices to last, the govenmient of Cote d'lvoire 
undertook ambitious investment programs, and accumulated enormous external debt 
(see Figure 7 for the country's debt to exports ratio). This increased spending had a 
significant adverse effect on the country's macroeconomic stability, especially since 
between 1977 and 1980, export prices fell by 6.5 % (Figure 6), annually, and the 
country's terms of trade declined from 140.2 to 98.1 in the same period (Figure 6). 
This price shock led to many of the economic problems that the country faced in the 
1980s. 
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Figure 6. Terms of Trade and Exports in Cote d'lvoire since 1970 
3.2.1.2 Policy Reforms in Cote d'lvoire 
In an attempt to address its dire economic circumstances. Cote d'lvoire sought 
assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, in February 1981, the country 
signed an extended arrangement with the IMF covering a three-year period. This was 
to be followed by six standby agreements up to 1991, making the total support from 
the IMF during the decade equal to SDR 1 billion. On its part, the World Bank 
provided three structural adjustment loans between 1981 and 1986 totaling $650 
million, and six sectoral adjustment loans between 1989 and 1991, totaling $780 
million (Hussain and Faruquee, 1994). 
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3.2.1.3 The R^orm Package 
In the period of 1984-86, Cote d'lvoire attempted to reform its incentive 
regime in order to encourage industrial production in the export sector. The reforms 
were to be implemented in the following stages. First, the country was to eliminate 
quantitative restrictions and replace them by temporary import surtaxes. The second 
uj 200 Idebt/exprt 
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Figure 7. Debt to Exports Ratio in Cote d'lvoire for Selected Years 
stage consisted of a comprehensive tariff reform, where a uniform effective tariff rate 
of 40% was to be established. In the third stage, a subsidy of 40% of value added was 
to be granted to industrial exports and later to agricultural exports, in order to 
compensate exporters for the overvaluation of the exchange rate, and to offset the 
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anti-export bias of the import protection regime (World Bank, 1994). In the last stage, 
tariff exemptions on the purchase of intermediate inputs were to be abolished. 
The implementation of the first stage of the reform program took place in 
1985. Although quantity restrictions (QR's) were removed, and the average import 
duty was increased fi-om 26% in 1985 to 33% in 1986 (see Figure 8), the payment of 
export subsidies was delayed until late 1986. However, by 1988, due to pressures from 
internal mterest groups, some reversals started occurring. The QR's returned, and as 
of 1991 tariflFs ranged fi"om 0 to 151%. Thus, by 1991, the reform program that was 
announced in 1985, had been reversed. 
We must note here that as a member of the CFA'* currency zone, the exchange 
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Figure 8. Average Tariff Rates in Cote d'lvoire since 1976 
4.CFA is Conimunaute Financiere Afiricaine, the currency zone for Francophone African countries. 
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rate was not an instrument of adjustment for the country. This is because, until 1994, 
the CFA was pegged to (and fiilly backed by the French treasury) the French Franc at 
a fixed rate of 50CFA per FF. Thus, the changes (devaluation) in exchange rate 
policies required by the structural adjustment programs could not be implemented in 
the CFA zone. Some have argued that the lack of the exchange rate as an adjustment 
instrument may have hurt the sequencing coordination of the different components of 
the reform programs in the countries in the CFA zone (Rouis; 1994). 
A second trade reform package was introduced in 1990. The intention again 
was to promote export and rationalize the system of import duties so as to lower the 
average level of tariff rates, as well as their dispersion (World Bank, 1994; Coulibaly, 
1993). In the period of 1992-95, the new program was to eliminate most non-tariff 
barriers, and abolish reference prices on imports. The government had a medium 
objective of a two-duty tariff structure in the following range: a minimum of 10-15%, 
mode of 20-25%, and a maximum of25-35%. Also, export subsidies were to be 
gradually phased out. 
3.2.2 Senegal 
3.2.2.1 Overview of the Economy 
Senegal is a West African former French colony which gained its independence 
in August 1960. This country of about eight million people covering an area of 
196,192 sq. km., is one of the stable democracies of Africa, even though in more than 
thirty years, the country has only been led by two different presidents: Leopold Sedar 
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Senghor from 1960 to 1980 and Abdou Diouf from 1981 to the present. The country 
is at the bottom of the lower-middle-income income countries, with a per capita 
income of $750 in 1993. In Figure 9, we present the average growth of the Senegalese 
GDP since 1970. 
As the figure clearly shows, after a slow start in the 1960s, the country, which 
by all accounts inherited a well developed physical and administrative infrastructure 
(Dakar was the capital of the former French West Africa), displayed dynamism 
throughout the 1970s, before experiencing economic crisis in the late 1970s to early 
1980s. As Figure 10 shows, the current account balance, aheady consistently negative, 
worsened during the period of 1979-1981 and remained negative throughout the 
|Bsngdpgr 
Figure 9. The Annual Percentage Change in GDP in Senegal since 1960 
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1980s. There were several factors that could explain the negative growth of the 
economy in the early 1980s. According to a 1987 report by the World Bank, a 
"combination of poor financial and investment policies, worsened terms of trade and 
successive droughts plunged an already weakened economy into a severe crisis" 
(Rouis; 1994, p 291). Indeed, between 1978 and 1981, Senegal suffered two major 
droughts, a dive in the world price of its exports crop, peanuts (see Figure 11), a 
current account deficit of 12.5% of GDP, negative savings, external debt to GDP ratio 
of 67.4%, and an inflation rate of 12% (p 291). 
The negative growth of GDP in the early 1980s can thus be explained by both 
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Figure 11. Indices of the Terms of Trade, Real Exchange and 
Exports in Senegal 
internal and external economic conditions. By the late 1970s the government of 
Senegal began to initiate reform programs with consultations with the World Bank and 
the IMF. Until 1990, the country has received four structural adjustment loans (1980, 
1986, 1987, 1990) supported by the World Bank. However, trade reforms did not go 
into effect until 1986. 
3.2.2.2 The R^orm Package 
In 1986, Senegal undertook trade reform measures as part of the New 
Industrial Policy. According to the UNDP and the World Bank, the objectives of the 
reform policies consisted in liberalizing the import sector, by abolishing non-tariff 
barriers (NTB's), eliminating special tariff regimes, and "rationalizing" the tariff 
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Structure. These reforms were to be phased in between 1986 and 1989. 
In fact, according to the World Bank (1992), by 1988, the composition of the 
tariff structure was to include average rates of 60%, 40% and 20% for luxury goods, 
final goods, and raw materials, respectively (see Table 1). On the export side, the 
export subsidy was to be reformed by changing the basis for the calculation of export 
subsidies, and simplifying the procedures for obtaining trading licenses. (UNDPAVorld 
Bank, 1993). 
3.2.2.4 The Results 
The Senegalese economy, even more than many countries in Afiica, depends 
on trade revenues. In fact in a 1994 study conducted by the World Bank, Senegal was 
ranked first among Afiican countries with the highest tariff rates. Among other things, 
the reduction of revenues caused the govenmient to reverse some of the policy 
initiatives. Indeed, tariff reforms caused tax revenues as a percentage of GDP to drop 
fi"om 18.1% in 1984 to 14.3% in 1988. 
Table 1. Indicators of Senegal's Import Protection 
Table 1: Import Protection in Senegal, 1985-1991 
Indicator 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Average rate of protection 
Effective tariff rates(%)a 
165.4 111 111 89.3 94.6 97.7 
18.1 23 25.6 23 25.2 28.6 30.3 
a. Calculated as customs receipts as % of imports (cif) by original author 
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Other factors that contributed to the drop in tariff revenues included 
smuggling, imports exemptions, and underinvoicing (Rouis; 1994). In any case, 
whereas the average rate of protection (with all surcharges included) had been reduced 
from 111% in 1986 to 89.3% in 1988, it rose back up in 1990 to 98%. 
3.2.3 Mali 
3.2.3.1 Overview of the Economy 
Mali is the third CFA zone country in this study. It is a West African country 
of about eight million people covering an area of l,240,000sq. km. Mali achieved 
independence in September 1960, and has been led mostly by military regimes until the 
multipartite elections of April 1992, that brought President Konare to power. 
The structure of the sectoral contribution to the gross domestic product has 
not changed since 1970, although the magnitude of each sector's contribution has 
changed. Thus, in 1970, whereas agriculture contributed 61% to GDP in 1970, 
industry 11%, and manufacturing 15%, the numbers stood at 42%, 7%, and 9%, 
respectively in 1993. The most important change occurred in the services sector 
however. In 1970, this sector contributed 28% to GDP, but in 1993, the contribution 
stood at 42%.' Figure 12 shows the growth rate GDP in Mali since 1960. The 
country's GDP performed quite well during the 1970s, but took a downturn in the 
early 1980s, and has not quite recovered yet. Droughts, territorial dispute with 
neighbors, internal political instability, (Mali has suffered a Tuareg rebeUion in the 
S.See the 1995 World Bank World Development Report 
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North until a tentative accord was signed between the government and the rebels in 
1993), worsening terms of trade, and poor economic policies may have contributed to 
the poor performance of the economy. Figure 13 shows the movement in the country's 
real exchange rate, terms of trade and exports. 
A combination of appreciation in the real exchange rate, and a worsening terms 
of trade seemed to have caused exports to fall in the late 1970s to raid-1980s. Exports 
picked up again from the mid-1980s onwards. Prior to 1986, Mali had complex import 
and export tax schemes, consisting of a large number of tax instruments, and a highly 
dispersed tariff structure. The reforms began in 1986, and were reintroduced at an 
increased rate in 1990. As in the case of Senegal and Cote d'lvoire, the objectives of 
the reforms consisted in simplifying and streamlining the structure of trade taxation, 
and reducing the dispersion in trade protection. Thus, in 1990, all import licensing 
requirements and quantity restrictions were removed, export monopolies, export 
licensing requirements, and most exports taxes were also abolished. By 1988, most 
import monopolies were eliminated, and quantity restrictions on 10 import goods, 
which constituted 40% of all imports were also removed. Once again, due to its 
membership in the CFA currency zone, the country could not use nominal exchange 
rate as policy tool with which to achieve devaluation of the real exchange rate and 
enhancement of the country's competitiveness. We must note here that, generally, 
since they could not use the nominal exchange rate as a policy tool, the CFA zone 
countries attempted to achieve real depreciation of the exchange rate by lowering 
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domestic inflation (through fiscal and monetary policies) below the rates of competitor 
countries.® 
3.2.3.2 The Reform Results 
According to the 1995 issue of the World Bank's Trend in Developing 
Economies, it is estimated that the reform program helped to improve economic 
performance in Mali over the adjustment period. As Figure 12 above shows, real GDP 
growth increased fix)m an annual average of less than 2% in the early 1980s to about 
3% between 1988 and 1993. Figure 14 shows the current account balance as a ratio of 
GDP. The fiscal deficits declined fi-om 12% of GDP in 1991 to 9.6% in 1993, and, the 
current account balance improved fi^om a deficit of 14% of GDP in 1985, to 9 .77% of 
GDP in 1993 (Figure 14). The adjustment policies also resulted in the reduction of the 
range of import duties fi-om 0%-200% to 6%-41% in 1990 (World Bank, 1990). 
3.2.4. Kenya 
3.2.4.1 Overview of the Economy 
Kenya is an Eastern Afiican country which achieved its independence fi-om 
Britain in 1963, after the bloody Mau Mau revolution led by the first president of the 
country, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta. Since 1978, Kenya has been led president Daniel Arap 
Moi, who replaced Mr. Kenyatta after his death. During the first decade after 
independence, the Kenyan economy grew at a remarkable average rate of more than 
6.Generally, the real exchange rate is found by multiplying the nominal exchange rate by the ratio of the 
trade-weighted world wholesale price index to the concerned country's CPI. Hence, a rechiction in the CPI 
will be expected to result^re/em parabus, in the increase in the real exchange rate, thus achieving the 
desired depreciation. 
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Figure 14. The Current Account Balance as a Ratio of the 
GDP in Mali 
8% per annum. Government policies and expanding domestic demand helped to foster 
higher production in both the agricultural and the industrial sector. 
Figure 15 depicts the annual growth rate of GDP in Kenya since 1964. The 
Kenyan economy decelerated in the mid- to late 1970s because of the two oil 
embargoes of 1973 and 1979, and again in the early 1990s because of the inability of 
the government to maintain the stabilization programs which it had begun to 
implement in the 1980s. In any case, structural problems such as extensive government 
intervention in marketing, inward-looking industrial polices, and the reliance on a few 
exports crops such as coffee and tea, which account for 40% of the merchandise 
exports, rendered the economy vulnerable to potential ineflBciency on the part of 
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Figure 15. The Annual Growth Rate of GDP in Kenya (%) 
parastatals, and the vagaries of external factors such as the terms of trade. Figure 16 
depicts the indices of the real exchange rate, the terms of trade and exports in Kenya at 
various times since 1960. In Figure 16, successive yearly declines in the terms of trade 
in the early 1980s were accompanied by a corresponding worsening of exports. The 
real exchange rate depreciated during the same period but was unable to help the 
performance of the country's exports. Devaluation of the real exchange rate again 
occurred in the mid- to late 1980s, as fulfillment of the adjustment programs. A 
favorable terms of trade, liberalization in the trade sector, and real devaluation of the 
exchange rate helped the exports sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, as 
Figure 17 shows, the Kenyan current account posted a positive balance in 1993! 
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Figure 16. Movements in the Kenyan Terms of Trade, 
Exchange Rate, and Exports since 1960 
Due to the dismal performance of the economy in the early 1980s, the 
government undertook several reform and stabilization programs. However, several 
factors contributed to an uncertainty as to the sustainability of these programs. These 
fectors included a failed coup attempt by members of the Air Force in 1982 (this 
branch of the military was subsequently disbanded), a drought in 1984, and a lack of 
transparency of the implementation of the reforms. This first attempt at adjustment 
therefore did not succeed. A second adjustment program was put into place in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
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Figure 17. The Current Account Balance in Kenya since 1975 
3.2.4.2 The Reform Package 
Due to the high level of quantitative restrictions (QRs) in the form of quotas 
and import licensing which prevailed throughout the 1980s, one of the major targets of 
the reform program undertaken in 1987 consisted in replacing the QRs by near-
equivalent tarififs, and rendering the licensing process more speedy and transparent. 
Another objective was to reduce and rationalize tariff rates, to enhance the promotion 
of alternative exports products. According to World Bank accounts, the government 
of Kenya was committed to achieving these objectives by June 1995. 
Quantitative restrictions were indeed removed, with the coverage being 
reduced from 71% of all imports in 1985 to just 0.2% in 1992. Progress was also 
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reported in tari£f reforms. First, in 1988, most specific tariffs were replaced by ad 
valorem rates, and then the number of rates were reduced from 25 to 17. Overall, the 
adjustment programs led to a reduction in the unweighted average rate of tariff from, 
40% in 1987/1988 to 34% in 1991/1992, and the import weighted tariffs fell from an 
average of 30% to 20% during the same period (Figure 18.) In addition, after being 
pegged to a basket of the same currencies found in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
basket, the Kenyan Shilling began to follow a flexible regime in 1988, and by 1991 the 
real exchange rate depreciated by 43% in 1991, relative to its 1985 value (see Figure 
16 above). 
In the export sector, efforts were made to reduce the anti-export biases, such 
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Figure 18. Average Unweighted Tariffs and Imports Weighted 
Tariffs in Kenya since 1985 
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as the licensing requirements that had to be renewed annually. In 1988, the 
government of Kenya removed existing export taxes on coffee and tea, and in 1990, 
the Export Development Project (EDP) broadened the coverage of an existing export 
compensation scheme and established an export processing zone. As with all other 
countries, adjustment in Kenya has not followed a smooth course, and needs to be 
strengthened in many areas. 
3.2.5 Tanzania 
3.2.5.1 Overview of the Economy 
Tanzania, a neighbor of Kenya, is also a former British colony. The country, in 
its present form, was established in 1964 through the union of the Republic of 
Tanganyika and the People's Republic of Zanzibar, an Island oflf of the coast of the 
Indian Ocean. Out of the eight African countries that we consider in this thesis, 
Tanzania is a unique case because until 1985, the country was led by President Julius 
K. Nyerere, a strong socialist and mandst ideologue. With a per capita GNP estimated 
to be only $90 in 1993 (World Bank, 1995), the country is one of the poorest in the 
world. The economy is mainly agricultural based, as this sector accounts for over 50% 
of the country's GDP. 
Figure 19 depicts the annual percentage change in the country's GDP. The 
growth rate of the GDP of Tanzania since independence has not been fantastic. 
Between 1965-80, the economy grew at an aimual average of 3.9%, whereas in 1980-
89, it grew at 2.6%. However, these aggregate statistics mask the sometimes 
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Figure 19. The Annual Growth Rate of GDP in Tanzania (%) 
abysmal negative growth that the country has experienced, particularly in the 1980s 
(e.g. -57% between 1985 and 1986). 
The performance of the Tanzanian economy has been very much tied to the 
social and economic policies promulgated by the government since 1967. For instance, 
the Arusha Declaration laid the foundation for the ideology of Ujamaa, which is the 
Tanzanian brand of socialism, and meant among other things, self-reliance, collective 
villagization, and the nationalization of banks, insurance and industrial companies.^ 
Tanzania established one the best social systems in Africa (maybe in the world), 
however this social system relied extensively on government welfare programs. 
7. See Campbell and Stein (1992) 
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Furthermore, the socialist policies put into place by the government inhibited private 
sector development and contributed to the creation of parastatals whose performance 
was plagued with inefficiencies. The country had to cope with drou^s, a very costly 
war with Uganda, a fall in the terms of trade, and higher energy prices, factors which, 
combined, led to a deep internal economic crisis. Figure 20 presents the movements 
Tanzania's exchange rate, terms of trade and exports. Because of the economic 
deterioration, the Tanzanian government, which has, on numerous public occasions, 
lambasted the IMF for attempting to introduce capitalism into the country, was forced 
to approach the organization not only to draw on its non-conditional gold tranche, but 
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Figure 20. Movements in the Tanzanian Real Exchange 
Rate, Terms of Trade, and Exports 
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for additional credit facility as well (Stein, 1992). Subsequent to talks that began in 
1974, the IMF presented the government with a conditional program for economic 
adjustment in 1981. The government rqected the conditions set in the program, and 
negotiations broke down. However, as Figure 21 shows, the country's crisis continued 
to deepen. 
Years 
Figure 21. The Current Account Deficit in Tanzania since 1976 
The figure shows that since 1976, the current account deficit has been 
persistent and high. The government approached the IMF again in 1986. A new 
program was introduced containing the same conditions as the 1981 package. But, this 
time a new president was in place, and the terms of the agreement were written into 
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the goverranent's budget. Below is an overview of the adjustment program undertaken 
in 1986 in Tanzania. 
3.2.5.2 The Reform Package 
In 1986, the government of Tanzania entered into a new agreement with the 
IMF. This agreement was formulated as the Economic Recovery Program which was 
proposed as part of the national budget in 1986 (Campbel and Stein; 1992, p 15).The 
main objectives of the program concerned the liberalization and rationalization of the 
exchange rate, as well as liberalization in the trade sector. According to Dean, Desai 
and Riedel (1994), "prior to reform, the main constraint on imports was the extensive 
system of foreign exchange constraints [in Tanzania]." (p 47) It is estimated that 
compared to its 1980 value, the Tanzanian Shilling has appreciated in real terms, by 
74% in 1983, with an accompanying black market rate of 300%. 
Under liberalization programs, most foreign exchange constraints were 
abolished; the Tanzanian Shilling, valued at 17 to the U.S. dollar in March 1986, fell to 
a rate of 40 per dollar in Jime 1986, by 1987, the rate was 90, and by 1990, it was 193 
to the dollar (Campbell and Stein, 1992). In the trade sector, non-tariflFbarriers 
(NTB's) in the form of import licensing and foreign exchange control, had been the 
main instrument of import control. Under the adjustment programs, NTBs were 
dismantled, and the role of tariffs as revenue generating instruments for the 
government became prominent. Tanzania maintained 18 different rates ranging 
between 15 and 200% prior to adjustment. By 1990, the number of rates had been 
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reduced to four. Also, the maxiinum tariff was lowered to 100% in 1988, and the trade 
weighted average tariff fell to 33%, 16% and 23% for consumer, intermediary and 
capital goods, respectively. Further, restrictions on exports were removed, and 
adjustment occurred in other sectors, including banking, infrastructure, and 
government finances. 
According to the World Bank (1995), the adjustment programs combined with 
increased availability of external financing to produce some positive resuhs for the 
economy of Tanzania. The gross domestic product and exports grew by an average of 
4% between 1987-1994. Small scale industrial activities, and agricultural production 
also grew during this time. 
3.2.6 Malawi 
Malawi is a small East African country, with a population of 8.8 million, 
occupying an area of 118,484 sq. km., that achieved independence from Great Britain 
in 1964. Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, a U.S. educated physician, became the first and 
only president of the country (Dr. Banda declared himself President for Life in 1970), 
until 1994, when pressures from the donor community and internal economic malaise 
forced him to call for multipartite elections, which he lost. 
The country posted a per capita GNP of $200 in 1993. Since 1970, there has 
not been a dramatic change in the structure of production. In 1970, agricultural 
production contributed 44% to the GDP, industrial production contributed 17%, and 
services, 39%. In 1993, the same statistics stood at 39% for agriculture, 18% for 
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industry, 43% for services, and 12% for manu&cturing. The foUowing chart represents 
the growth rate of GDP in Malawi since 1960. 
The development strategy adopted by the government during the 1960 and 
1970s focused on infrastructure and agricultural development. In addition, the country 
was open during this period, and enjoyed a highly favorable terms of trade for its main 
exports: tobacco, tea, coffee and cotton. These conditions led to a strong growth rate 
in the GDP, and a growth in the real per capita income of 3% per year (World Bank, 
1995). In the 1980s however, the country became progressively protectionist. 
Rationing of the foreign exchange and quantity restrictions were instituted, and the 
average tariff" rate was raised (see Figure 24). As Figures 22 and 23 show, the trade 
sector responded negatively to these protectionist policies, and the economy grew at 
negative rates during the early 1980s. 
The protectionist policies brought imports down in the early 1980s, but during 
the same period, external shocks such as terms of trade deterioration, and worldwide 
increase in oil prices, dampened production and trade of export products. Figure 23 
shows that the decline in imports outstripped that in exports, producing an 
improvement in the trade balance in the early 1980s. However, this did not last. By 
1987, the effects of the aforementioned shocks in addition to the disruption in 
transportation routes caused by the war in Mozambique, and the drought suffered by 
the region, caused exports to decline, imports to increase and a worsening of the trade 
balance. 
63 
Bmwgdpgr 
Years 
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Figure 23. Imports, Exports and the Trade Balance in 
Malawi 
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Figure 24. Average Tariff Rates in Malawi since 1976 
The government began trade reforms in 1988, with the unification of the tariff 
schedule, as the range shrank fi-om 0-220% prior to 1988, to 0-45% in 1988. Imports 
licensing were removed except in the case of alcohol, gems, electric goods, and luxury 
goods (Worid Bank, 1994). 
The kwacha, the country's currency was significantly devalued, and foreign 
exchange restrictions were removed. However, internal issues such as smallholder 
farmers' access to cash crops, human rights, and social structures remain an 
impediment to sustained economic recovery and development. 
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3.2.7 Ghana 
Ghana has been hailed as the "star pupil of adjustment" (Harold Alderman, 
1994), and a "front-runner in adjustment" (Leechor, 1994). Ghana located on the gold 
coast in West Africa, is the first African country to attain independence from Great 
Britain, in March 1957.^ It was led from independence to 1966 by the Mr. Kwame 
Nkruma, a U.S. educated man, widely known and respected for his philosophy on 
African Unity and self-reliance. The country is endowed with considerable natural 
resources, including vast reserves of gold, diamonds, bauxite, manganese. Forests, and 
arable land are also abundant in the country. It has enormous potential for electric 
power. For example, the Akossombo dam supplies electricity to neighboring countries 
including the author's own country of Benin. The annual growth rate of the GDP in 
Ghana is displayed in Figure 25. 
The figure shows that Ghana enjoyed a relatively high level of growth 
throughout the 1970s. The economy has traditionally depended on primary production 
and exports (cocoa is the main export crop), but its industrial sector, which accounts 
for about 16 of the gross domestic product, is relatively well developed and diverse. 
Ghana has also enjoyed a relatively high level of living standards. Figure 26 depicts the 
per capita GDP in Ghana since 1960 (if the per capita GDP can be used a measure of 
living standards). At one point Ghana was classified as part of the lower middle-
income countries, with a per capita income which grew consistently since 1960, with a 
8. Note Ethiopia and Liberia were never cxilonized by a foreign power. 
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Figure 25. The Annual Percentage Change in GDP in Ghana 
peak of $2740 in 1982. We note that mstead of a surplus shown in the current account 
balance in the late 1970s, the account posted a negative balance in 1981, and has not 
recovered from that position as of yet. 
However, as was the case in many developing countries, external shocks such 
as deterioration in the terms of trade, and the two oil shocks of the 1970s and poor 
internal economic management led the country into a deep economic crisis begiiming 
in the late 1970s.Between 1970 and 1982, real exports earnings fell by 52%, and 
savings and investment as a percentage of GDP which had been at a 12% level, all but 
disappeared (World Bank, 1995).Figure 27 depicts the change in the country's oirrent 
account balance since 1975. Also, Figure 28 shows inflation rates in Ghana have 
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Figure 26. The Per Capita GDP in Ghana since 1960 
traditionally hovered around 7%, but peaked to record highs in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Reform measures were &st introduced in 1983 to restore macroeconomic 
balance, encourage private sector savings, and streamline government finances. 
A three-year structural adjustment program was also undertaken in 1987-89, 
1989-91, and 1991-92. Under this plan, steps were undertaken to devalue the cedi, the 
nation's currency.' Foreign exchange licensing and rationing were eliminated. In 
addition, the import licensing and other NTBs were prohibited. TarijBf policies have not 
been consistent however. Although average tariffs were reduced fi-om 30% to 17% 
9. This was not an easy feat An earlier attempt at devaluation under the Busia Administration resulted 
street riots, and a successful coup (Leechor, 1994) 
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Figure 27. The Current Account Deflcit of Ghana since 1975 
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Figure 28. The Rate of Inflation in Ghana since 1968 
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between 1983 and 1991, they were raised in 1987, and 1990, and 1994 (see Figure 
29). Further adjustment has occurred in the export sector. 
The export licensing system was abolished, tax and price incentives were 
extended to exporters, particularly to cocoa burners who saw an increase in the 
producer prices for cocoa for the 1990/91 season. Subsidies on inputs to cocoa 
production were eliminated during the same period, resulting in an effective nominal 
increase in the farmers' price by 22% (World Bank, 1994). Figure 30 depicts the 
change in export, real exchange rates, and Ghana's terms of trade. The recovery 
program undertaken by the govenmient of Ghana resulted in an average real growth 
rate of the GDP of 5% per year during the 1980-90 decade, as compared to negative 
growths during the preceding decade, both exports and imports (see Figure 30, and 
Figure 31) have increased because of the removal of barriers in both sectors, farmers' 
incomes increased, real food prices fell (see Figure 28) and social spending was 
increased as well. 
We note that foreign assistance played a considerable role in the adjustment 
process in Ghana. Official aid to Ghana increased from $270 million in 1984 to $385 
million in 1986, and again to $480 million in 1990 (World Bank, 1994). Finally, while 
adjustment programs have, in general, produced desirable results in Ghana, the 
government must increase its efforts in maintaining macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
discipline, and enhancing its incentives for increased private investment. Maintaining 
these factor will result in a sustained performance by the economy. 
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Figure 29. Tariff Rates in Ghana since 1984 
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Figure 30. Real Exchange Rate, Terms of Trade and 
Exports in Ghana 
71 
400 rr 
[agntrdbl 
Years 
Figure 31. The Balance of Trade in Ghana since 1960 
3.2.6 Nigeria 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Its population, standing 
presently at 105.3 million, represents 20% of the total population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As an oil producing country, and member of the OPEC, Nigeria possesses 
enormous potential for development and growth. 
However, since its access to independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, 
the country has fought a major civil war, the Biafran War, which devastated and 
divided the country, it has known numerous military coups (the most recent occurred 
in 1993), and its attempts to return to civilian rule have all failed so far. The recent 
economic history of Nigeria presents an interesting case study in development 
economics. First, we present, in Figure 32, the growth rate of the Nigerian economy. 
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The first observation that we make fi^om Figure 32 is that the performance of 
the Nigerian economy was not spectacular in the 1960s. In fact, in the mid to late 
1960s, when the Biafi^ War was raging and ravaging the country, the economy was 
growing at a negative rate. However, in the 1970s, heightened exploration and 
exploitation of oils fields led to periodic booms in the economy. Indeed, with 
petroleum constituting 34% of GDP, over 97% of total exports, and contributing 80% 
to government revenues, movements in the economy closely follows movements in the 
exports sector, or rather in the petroleum sector. 
Figure 32. The Growth Rate of GDP and Exports in 
Nigeria since 1960 
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As Figure 32 shows, during the boom years of 1973 and 1979 (the two oils 
embargo which sent oil prices soaring), the export sector was experiencing a high 
growth rate, which is paralleled by the growth rate of the GDP. Figure 33 depicts the 
changes in the Nigerian terms of trade and real exchange rates. 
When oil prices fell in the mid 1980s, exports fell as weU, leading the GDP to 
grow, at times, at negative rates. There occurred another oil boom during the Gulf 
War. The war created an oil shortage which sent the world price of oil soaring, and 
Nigeria's terms of trade to a higher level. From Figures 32 and 33, we note that as the 
country's terms of trade ameliorated, GDP growth turned from a negative rate to a 
positive one. 
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Figure 33. Nigeria's Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate 
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But, Nigeria is not a monolithic society. Furthermore, there are constant 
political struggles between the military and the rest of the society on the one hand, and 
among the many different ethnic and religious entities of the country. We believe that 
this constant battle over the control of the country's vast resources distracts the 
planners from focusing on a rational allocation of resources that would enhance the 
economic growth and welfare of the society. But, more tangibly, the usage of the 
considerable oil revenues of the country in the 1970s laid the foundations for its 
abysmal economic record in the 1980s. 
3.2.6.1 The Inefficient Usage of the Nigerian Resources 
During the oil booms of the 1970s, the government of Nigeria (or the different 
governments that succeeded each other) undertook expensive infrastructure 
expenditures which were ostensibly designed to raise the productive capacity of the 
country and to heal the wounds of the Biafran War (World Bank, 1995). While these 
ventures may have achieved the latter target, their potentiality for long term viability 
were not well studied. Such projects as the construction of transportation facilities 
(roads, ports), and heavy social spending were implemented without enough attention 
paid to their eflScacy and financial viability. 
What is more, the massive expenditure campaigns were almost entirely 
dependent on oil revenues. In the meantime, development in other non-oil based 
exports crops such as cocoa, peanut and cotton was neglected. Thus, when there 
occurred a shift in the Nigerian terms of trade in the early 1980s, the government's 
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budget deficit began to worsen. The data on the government expenditure and budget 
deficit is shown in Figure 34. 
The budget deficit was nonexistent or insignificant throughout the 1970s, and 
became more prominent in the early 1980s due to the ever increasing government 
expenditure. Remarkably, during this period, massive government expenditure raged 
on even as oil revenues were plummeting (Abuja, a city that rivals any in the West, and 
the current seat of the government was built firom scratch with oil revenues and large 
external loans). But, this expenditure did not translate into a sustained improvement in 
the standards of living of the Nigerian population. Figure 35 shows that in the late 
1970s to early 1980s, Nigerians enjoyed a relatively higher standard of living (the per 
capita GDP reached over $1000 in 1980) than their neighbors in the region. We 
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Figure 34. Government Expenditure and Budget Deficit in Nigeria 
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observe however that there occurred a precipitous drop in the GDP per capita aiter 
1984, as oil prices fell. Nigeria was not able to adjust to price shocks in the oil market 
for its export base was not diversified or well developed to fiill potential. Austerity 
measures were introduced by the government in late 1983 and in 1984. 
However, the plan, which included across-the-board budgetary cuts, and 
restrictions on imports and foreign exchange, did not address the distortions and 
structural problems of the economy (Worid Bank, 1995). Finally, in July 1986, against 
fierce domestic opposition, the government of Babangida entered into agreement with 
the IMF to initiate a host of economic reforms, a prerequisite to secure new loans (and 
reschedule old debt) from the country's creditors. 
Figure 35. The Nigerian GDP per Capita since 1960 
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3.2.6.2 Key Components of the 1986 Structural Adjustment Program 
The major element of the adjustment program initiated in Nigeria concerned 
exchange devaluation and trade liberalization (Faruqee, 1994). >^rth respect to the 
foreign exchange regime, the objective was to remove exchange controls and establish 
a market determined exchange rate policy. Kigeria had pursued a fixed exchange rate 
and exchange rationing policy prior to adjustment. As a result, the parallel market 
premium was as high as 200%. A dual exchange rate regime was introduced in 
September 1986, with the secondary market rate determined by auction. In 1989, the 
two windows were merged into a unified market, and currency was traded through the 
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market. By 1991, the Naira stood at only 24% of its 
1980 value, and the parallel market premium had been cut to 23% (World Bank, 
1984). 
The objectives of the trade reforms included abolishing the import licensing 
system, which had been the main instrument of trade control. A new tariff regime was 
developed and policies were implemented to promote exports. Before 1986, a 
surcharge of 30% was levied on imports into Nigeria. This was abolished as part of the 
reform program, and the average tariff rate (see Figure 36) was decreased to 23% 
(World Bank, 1994). 
Reforms in the export sector included removal of export duties, prohibitions, 
and most licensing requirement (World Bank, 1994). Exporters who used imported 
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Figure 36. Tariff Rates in Nigeria since 1980 
raw material in their production process were given preferential tariff rates, and these 
intermediary goods were also exempted from the 30% import surcharge. Incentives 
were given to encourage export of non-oil products, including the dismantling of 
marketing boards for cocoa, cotton, rubber, peanut, and palm kernel, and the 
liberalization of producer prices. (World Bank, 1994). Domestic opposition to the 
implementation of reforms in 1986 was adamant. Some arguments were based on the 
social cost of adjustment. But, even members of the business community (people and 
entities with enough wealth and clout to influence government decisions) feared that 
they may loose market shares and profits due to trade liberalization. Thus, by 1990, 
some reversals have occurred in the adjustment process. A new tariff schedule was 
mtroduced in 1988, which provided for rates slightly higher than the 1986 program. In 
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addition, a 7% surcharge was imposed on all imports. By 1990, the average 
unweighted tariff rates had risen to 33%, with wide dispersion (Dean, Desai, and 
Riedel, 1994). 
By mere economic measures, the adjustment programs in Nigeria, including 
liberalization (though patchy) of the trade regime, devaluation of the real exchange 
rate, and abolition of price control, produced some positive results for the country. As 
Figure 32 shows, both exports and GDP posted positive growth in the late 1980s to 
early 1990s, with the latter growing at an average of 5% a year between 1987 and 
1992 (World Bank, 1995). Ultimately, economic problems in Nigeria can be properly 
addressed only after the country's messy political affairs are sorted out, beginning with 
the return to civilian rule. Next, we present a review of the literature on the empirical 
modeling of the credibility of reform policies. 
3.3 A Review of the Literature on the Empirical Modeling of the Credibility of 
Policy Reforms 
Several studies have presented empirical evidence on policy reversals and/or 
the importance of credible reforms in developing countries. For example, in their 
review of 59 countries that undertook IMF-supported Structural Adjustment 
Programs in the period of 1990-1992, Calika and Corsepius (1994) found evidence for 
actual trade policies reversals. They reported that in 13 out of the 59 countries 
reviewed, trade reforms were partially reversed. Of these 13 countries, all but 3 
"increased tariffs or imposed new surcharges on imports, [and] 4 widened the scope of 
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quantitative restrictions" (p 39). Further, Serven and Solimano (1992) estimated a 
shnple investment equation, using pooled cross-section time series data for a group of 
15 developing countries. One set of the explanatory variables of the equation consisted 
of the sample variability of some key macroeconomic variables. These were used as 
proxies for uncertainty, and therefore credibility. Their results indicated that the 
uncertainty proxies had a significant negative impact on investment. 
Many research projects have attempted to assess the impact of policy reforms 
on investment in developing nations. With respect to the Structural Adjustment 
Programs, \^ttorio Corbo and Patricio Rojas (1992), of the World Bank, propose 
measuring the marginal contribution of adjustment programs to economic growth, by 
calculating the difference between actual performance and an estimated counterfactual 
scenario of what would have happened in the absence of the program. Using four 
indicators to assess the performance of adjustment programs; rate of growth of GDP, 
ratio of saving to GDP, ratio of investment to GDP, and ratio of export to GDP, they 
propose three different approaches to evaluating liberalization programs. 
The first approach is the simple "before-and-after" approach. This method 
consists in comparing a given indicator of performance after a specific program or 
policy is adopted, to the performance of that indicator prior to the program. The 
following model is used to analyze the impact of a new program on economic 
performance. 
^y. = P (48) 
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where A^- is simply the change in the target variable between the program period and 
the previous one. The estimator P calculates the mean change across the group of 
countries that adopted adjustment programs (program countries), for each of the 
macroeconomic variable to be analyzed. 
There are several shortcomings to this approach. The main problem is that this 
method makes a ceteris paribus assumption, which, for the purpose of the analysis of 
the impact of adjustment programs is not realistic. Furthermore, according to this 
method, any change in the target variable is due exclusively to the newly adopted 
policy. 
In an attempt to correct for these shortcomings, the authors propose two other 
methods of estimation. The first one is the "control-group approach". The equation 
used for this method is: 
= PQ + Q 
where Q is a set of non-program and program countries, di is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if a country is a program country, and 0 otherwise. Notice that the 
non-program countries are the control group. A statistically significant 3i means that a 
change in the target variable in the program countries is different fi"om a corresponding 
change in the control group. 
This method allows us to control for the effect of changes in the global 
environment. However, the assumption is that the nonprogram and the control groups 
are equally affected by those changes. An attempt to find solutions to the problem led 
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the authors to propose a third approach; the "modified control-group approach". 
The main idea behind the "modified control-group" approach concerns 
accepting that the selection of program countries is not random, identifying the 
differences between program and non-program countries, and controlling for these 
differences in the performance analysis. The main equation used for this method is; 
Aji = A (;})_, + + A «!'+A't-i-e, (SO) 
Thus, a change in a target variable y in country i, is postulated to be a flmction 
of the set of macroeconomic policies that would have prevailed in the absence of the 
new program (xj), the change in world economic conditions (Wj); the total effect of 
adjustment programs, if these are in place (di); and a set of unobserved shocks specific 
to a country (e;). This model, according to the authors, allows for changing world 
conditions to affect different countries in different manners. 
With respect to the measurement of credibility, the literature offers several 
approaches. Many studies have used the Taylor and Jodice (1983) approach to assess 
political instability. The idea is that events such as the annual number of coups, 
revolutions, riots, demonstrations, executive adjustment, affect the probability of a 
govenmient collapse. Thus, if the political and social landscapes are unstable, then 
there is increased uncertainty with respect to fiiture govenmient policies, the private 
sector will find it difficult to make plans for future investment and production 
activities, and policy reform announcement by a sitting government may not be 
credible. 
83 
Aizenman and Marion (1991) measure polhicai instability by focusing on 
changes in macroeconomic policies, rather than changes in governments. The variables 
they constructed include government consumption expenditure, the share of public 
investment in GDP, government revenue, budget deficits, domestic credit expansion, 
monetary growth and inflation. These variables can then be used by an investor, in the 
decision to expand investment in the wake of a policy reform or not. 
Serven and Solimano (1992), postulate that private investment in developing 
nations is a function of the real GDP, the real exchange rate, the real public investment 
to GDP ratio, the foreign debt to GDP ratio, and a measure of instability. The model 
they use is: 
IP! Y= F{tiY,eJGI VM / Kc^) (51) 
where, EP is real private investment; Y is real GDP; e is the real exchange rate; IG is 
real public investment; D* is the foreign debt; and o, which the authors use as a proxy 
for credibility, is constructed by using key macroeconomic variables, such as the 
variability of the real exchange rate, and the variability of inflation. 
However, according to Bomer, Brunetti and Weder (1995), the above methods 
have shortcomings because they do not directly capture the insecurity faced by 
investors. For them, a direct approach, whereby investors are asked about what factors 
most directly influence their decision to invest in a country would produce more robust 
resuhs. Therefore, they prepared and sent questionnaires to a selected number of 
company managers in different countries. On the basis of the responses received, an 
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indicator of political credibility, POLCRED was constructed, which the authors used 
in various equations, including investment equations. 
We do not approach the question of credibility in a direct fashion. Rather, any 
inference we make with respect to credibility is based upon the results of our study of 
private responses to government policy reforms in Afiica. We provide the full details 
of our empirical models and their results below. 
3.3.1 The Research Question 
We test two main hypotheses in this study: 
a) Tariff reforms announced as part of Structural Adjustment Programs, 
produced significant effects on actual government policy: 
b) The change in government policy due to trade reforms had a significant 
effect on private actions (e.g., investment or production or trade activities) in 
African countries. 
The inference here is that in order for private agents to react significantly to an 
announced policy by the government, they must have determined that the 
announcement was credible. 
3.3.2 The Modeling Issues 
We use two models to test hypotheses (a) and (b). The first equation is used to 
model government tariflF policy. In the absence of precise data on policy rules in 
Afiican countries, we postulate that, in general, the tariff is set as a fimction of its own 
one-period lag, of private actions such as trade, and other selected economic variables. 
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Let Tt represent period t tariff, FTt-i represent the one-period lag of trade flows (the 
sum of total exports and imports), and X be the matrix of appropriate economic 
variables such as the country's external debt, government spending or deficit, foreign 
exchange reserves, etc.... We would expect that high external debt, high budget 
deficit, and low levels of foreign exchange reserves would lead the government to 
increase tariffs. The tariff model is presented as: 
r, = OTo +air,_, + a^Fr,_^ + MX + e, (52) 
where, oo is a constant, ai, and oz are the lagged tariff and trade flows parameters 
respectively, CX 'isa. vector of coeflBcients for the variables included in X, and et is the 
error term, assumed to be normally distributed, with mean=0, and a constant variance. 
Now, suppose that the government pre-commits to a particular tariff level, say, 
which is announced to the public. Then, (52) is modified to become: 
r, = ffo + a^Tf + + a^FT,_i + AOf + e, (53) 
We would declare that the government has fliliy adhered to its precommitment 
policy, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis that: 
= aj = 0^3 = 0, GT = 0, and a, = 1 (54) 
However, in the absence of a full adherence, then partial adherence obtains, if 
tti is (statistically) significantly greater than zero and the remaining coefiRcients are 
close to zero. 
Next, we present the trade flow model, which describes private agents' 
86 
behavior in the trade sector. We use the trade flow variable (the sum of total imports 
and total exports) to measure total activities in the trade sector. Below is an 
explanation of the relationship between our trade flow variable, and tariff policy. 
Theoretically, we would predict that, in a two-tradable-good economy, where 
the government actively uses trade policy, an increase in the domestic relative price of 
the export good (due, say, to a reduction in export the export tariff), would lead to an 
increase in the domestic production and trade of the exportable good. However, since 
an increase in the domestic relative price of the export good is equivalent to a decrease 
in the domestic price of the importable good, then, domestic production of the import 
good will decrease. But, in the absence of any change in total domestic demand, a 
reduction in domestic production of the import good will necessarily lead to an 
increase in the import of the good from the rest of the world. Thus, a reduction in the 
export tariff" leads to an increase in both total exports, and total imports. 
Now, assume that instead of an export tariflF, the government maintained an 
import tariff, and suppose there occurred a reduction in the import tariff". The lower 
tariff* will lead to a decrease in the domestic relative price of the import good, and a 
decrease in its domestic production. Again, in the absence of an accompanying 
reduction in domestic demand, imports will increase. And, since a decrease in the 
domestic relative price of the importable is equivalent to an increase in the domestic 
relative price of the exportable, then domestic production and trade of the export good 
will increase. 
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In all, we would predict that there will be an increase in a country's total trade 
activities as a result of tariff reduction, and the converse holds as well. Let f, be the 
predicted tariff that results from equations (52) or (53), Kto be a matrix of relevant 
economic variables, and to a vector of coeflBcients corresponding to V. Then, we 
propose the following model to estimate trade flows in the Africa countries under 
study; 
77; = A+A"?-,+M+^ 3«+7^ +^ ,- (55) 
The iirterpretation of (55) is that total private agents' activities in the trade 
sector in period t, is a fiinction of the one-period lag of the trade flow, the private 
sector forecast of tariffs and the disturbances from this forecast, and a matrix of other 
relevant economic variables. The inclusion of the tariff forecast and its residuals rests 
on the theoretical prediction that in general, the response of trade flows to anticipated 
changes in tariff should be different from what it would be for unanticipated changes. 
Note that in equation (55), the predicted tariff has a direct effect, Mid an indirect effect 
through investment decisions on trade flows. But, the tariff residuals only have a direct 
effect on trade flows. Now, suppose that the announcement of a pre-commitment 
policy is credible. Then, the private sector's prediction of tariffs becomes more certain, 
and agents would therefore be willing to commit more fixed resources to trade. Thus, 
if credible, a pre-commitment policy causes a shift in the short run supply curve or a 
movement along the long run supply curve. Given these commitments of fixed 
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resources in the case of a credible announcement, we would predict that the response 
of the private sector to anticipated changes in tariff should be less than its response to 
unanticipated changes. 
Another method of testing for the response of the private sector to reform 
policy is to simply add a time dummy variable in equation (55). The issue then 
concerns whether countries became more open by eliminating invisible barriers not 
present in the regressors in (55). This approach is quite appropriate in the African 
contest because, in all of the countries we analyzed, all forms of non-tariff barriers 
were used in the pre-adjustment period to curtail imports (and sometimes exports.)'" 
We include the one-period lagged tariff because we believe that any unsold 
inventory from one period may be regarded by private agents as investment for 
subsequent periods. This empirical necessity represents a slight deviation from our 
theoretical assumption of no link between any two periods. In the next section, we 
present our empirical resuhs. 
3.4 The Empirical Results and Data Sources 
3.4.1 The Data and Methodology 
Our data are collected from several sources. We used World Bank and IMF 
(IPS) data for trade flows and prices; import tariff, and the macro economic data. For 
most countries, we calculated the tariff rates from tariff revenues. Also, some 
countries had missing data for some years. These were filled in by the author's 
10. See Ezran and Svedberg (1991). 
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calculations. Most of the data covers the period of 1960 to 1994. However, the data 
on tariffs span only the period of 1980/81 to 1991/92 for most countries. 
There are eight African countries in our sample: Ghana, Kenya, Cote d'lvoire, 
Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and Nigeria, and Senegal. All have signed a reform program 
with the Bretton Woods institutions at various times since 1981. The data on tariff 
announcements come from various publications, and studies conducted by the World 
Bank. We were not able to obtain a specific schedule for tariff reduction for each 
country. Rather, the data usually provided for the target percent reduction in tariff 
rates at the end of the program period. We then generated an aimounced tariff series 
with the assumption that tariff rates will decrease by equal amounts each year until the 
target year. 
We used a panel data approach in this study instead of cross-sectional 
approach. Hsiao (1986) defines a panel, or longitudinal data set, as "one that foUows a 
given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple observations on each 
individual in the sample" (pi) There are several advantages to using a panel data 
approach. Among those of interest to this study are that it allows us to use a relatively 
"large" number of data points. This is important in our case, because we only have 11 
years of usable data, and our study requires dividing the sample into two. A 
conventional cross-sectional approach would not have provided enough data points 
for our estimations. Further, as Hsiao points out, the panel data approach allows us to 
utilize information on both the "intertemporal dynamics and the individualitj '^ of the 
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countries we are studying. Thus, in addition to studying a sample of countries over 
time, we can "observe" and, if need be, make inferences about the behavior of each 
individual country in our sample over time. 
Specifically, the basic model that is generally used for this discussion has the 
form." 
where the matrix ^ contains K regressors, not including the constant. The error 
tenn,^^, represems the effects of omitted variables that are particular to both the 
individual units and time periods. It is assumed that f ^  can be characterized by an 
independently distributed random variable with zero mean and variance equal to ct^. 
The intercept Oi measures the individual efifect. This effect taken to be constant 
over time t and specific to each individual i, can be assumed to the same across all 
individuals, in which case equation (56) can just be estimated by ordinary least 
squares, yielding consistent and efScient estimates of both a and p. 
However, as stated above, it is commonly assumed that there exists differences 
across units (or countries in the case of the present study). In this case, the model can 
be modified to become (this is known as fixed effects estimation. An alternative 
method is the random effects or error components model. For fiirther discussion, see 
Judge et. al. (1982), Hsaio(1986), and Greene (1993) and the section, in the present 
11. See Econometrif: AnalyCTs 2°  ^Edition, Greene. 
(56) 
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work, on specification tests): 
y=Da+Xp+s, (57) 
where, D=j^dj,d2-dn] ^ ^ matrix of country-specific dummy variables (n is the 
number of countries), and X is a Ixn matrix of regressors, excluding the constant. This 
model can also be estimated by OLS to obtain efiBcient and consistent parameters. We 
estimated the tariff and trade flows models using both equations (56) and (57). 
3.4.1.1 On the Issue of Sampling 
The implementation of models (52)-(55) requires the splitting of our sample 
into two subsamples representing the pre-agreement period and the post-agreement 
period, respectively. Our data indicate that even though countries signed agreements in 
different years throughout the 1980s, most of the countries that we study have signed 
SAP agreements by 1986. For example, in 1986, Nigeria, Mali, Tanzania, Senegal, 
introduced major reform programs. Both Kenya and Ghana introduced major reforms 
in 1987, and the process began in Malawi in 1988. Overall, we consider the period 
between 1980 and 1985 as the pre-announcement period, and the period between 
1986 and 1991 as the post-announcement period. We conduct our estimations using 
the windows version of RATS (4.20). 
3.4.2 The Regression Results 
We estimated two types of equations in an attempt to explain tariff policy and 
private trade choices in Afiica; the first type of model assumes a common cross­
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country effect, and the second is the fixed effects model. The next two sections report 
the resuhs of the tariff and trade models assuming a common cross-country effect. 
Then we report the results of the fixed effects tariff and trade models. In each case, we 
indicate the best model to be selected. Among the tests we perform are unit root tests 
and Chow tests for possibility of structural change, for both the tariff and trade 
models. 
Further, in each model, we test for the significance of the pre-commitment 
tariff in explaining the variable of interest. In addition, using the bootstrap technique, 
we test for the response of tariff policy to changes in exogenous conditions when a 
government has made a pre-commitment announcement. Finally, we perform a 
specification test (Hausman) for each model. 
3.4.2.1 The Results of the Tariff Model Assuming Common Effects 
Across Countries 
We report the results of the model where we assumed the constant term is the 
same across countries. Then the results of the fixed effects model, where we capture 
differences across countries are reported. 
We first estimate model (52) for the pre-agreement period. The equation 
(denoted Model TRFPRl) includes the foUowing variables: a constant, the lag of tariff 
(TRF {1}), the one-period lag of trade flows (LTRDFL{ 1}), government expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP (GVEXPG), the exchange rate (EXR), the log of GDP 
(LGDP), the external debt, as a percentage of GDP (EXDTG), the current account 
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deficit, as a percentage of GDP (CACG). The choice of theses variables was based 
mostly on the author's economic intuition. For example, we believe that, if a 
government uses commercial policies, and particularly for those governments who rely 
on trade revenues for a major portion of their expenditures, we should observe that 
tariff would be higher during periods of high government expenditure, high external 
debt, high current account deficits, and lower otherwise. Further, by including trade 
flows in the tariff regression, we are postulating that government policy responds 
partially to private decisions. 
The results of this first model are summarized in Table 2. The equation appears 
to be a good fit with an Ft of .97 and of .82. However, we believe that a 
combination of low t-statistics and high F-statistics may indicate the presence of 
multicoUinearity in the model. To correct this problem, we eliminate those variables 
which, fi-om our correlation matrix, appear to be the most highly correlated. We 
denote the resulting model as Model TRFPR2. This model regresses tariff on a 
constant (t-statistics =2.98) and three other variables: the one-period lag of tariff, 
TRF(l) (t-statistics=14.57), the exchange rate, EXR (t-statistics=-2.34), and the 
external debt, as a percentage of GDP, EXDTG (t-statistics=l .89). As the t-statistics 
indicate, all variables are significant, at least, at the 10% level. The model is 
parsimonious, with only four variables, and is a good fit with the ft remaining at 0.97, 
and the increasing slightly to 0.84. As Table 2 (Model TRFPR2) indicates, all of 
the explanatory variables have the expected signs. The one-period lag of tariff appears 
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to be an important predictor of the level of tariff and we would expect the relationship 
between the two variables to be positive. The exchange rate'^  is expressed as the 
number of local currency per dollar. A higher exchange rate implies a higher trade 
revenue for an unchanged world price and quantity traded. Thus, we would expect 
that, ceteris parabus, a rise in exchange rate will lead to higher revenue for the 
government, which can then be translated into a smaller tariff rate. We would therefore 
expect a negative relationship between tariff and exchange rate. Further, as indicated 
above, in periods of high external debt, a government which uses commercial policies, 
may increase tariffs in order to acquire more funds to service the debt. Thus, we 
expect tariff and government's external debt to be positively correlated. 
Throughout the paper, we will use residual plots to check the validity of the 
models we select for our study . Examining residual plots is a simple way of checking 
if the assumptions that have been made regarding model error terms are valid. Thus, a 
residual plot may be used to detect unequal variances, at different levels of the 
independent variables (Mendenhall and Sincich, 1989). If the assumptions on the error 
term are valid, then we would not detect any particular pattern in the plot of the 
residual series.'* Figure 37 presents the plot of the residuals of the pre-agreement tariff 
12. We used nominal exchange rate for this first estimation. Later, we substitute this for the real exchange 
rate, using the procedure described in footnote S. For this purpose, we used the British wholesale price for 
English-speaking countries, and France's wholesale price for French-speaking countries. 
13. A formal test for model specification is provided below. 
14. Notice that we can detect individual country effects fiom residual plot since each time interval on the 
X-axis of the residual plot refers to each individual country. The order of the countries is as follows; 
Ghana, Kenya. Cote d'lvoire, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, Nigeria and Senegal. 
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Table 2. Results of alternative pre-agreement tariff models 
Oaprf. Var.TRF 
ModatTRFPRI Mo<MTRFPR2 
2-tail 
signif. 
Stand. 2-tall Stand. 
Variables Coatr. Error t-atats sianif. Coafr. Error 
Constant 0.173 0.119 1.454 0.154 0.07 0.024 Z984 
TRF{1} 0.749 0.121 6.186 0.000 0.873 0.060 14.570 
LTRDFL 0.027 0.065 0.420 0.677 
LTRDFL{1} -0.019 0.066 -0.279 0.782 
GVEXPG -0.097 0.213 -0.457 0.651 
EXR -1.000E-04 7.99E-07 -1.975 0.056 -1.61E-06 6.90E-07 -Z339 
LGDP -0.013 0.031 -0.409 0.685 
KCHG 0.122 0.104 1.175 0.248 
EXDTG 0.019 0.011 1.712 0.095 0.016 8.69E-03 1.890 
CACG 0.124 0.209 0.592 0.557 
0.005 
0.000 
0.024 
0.065 
DOF=46 
SSE=0.21 
model against time. 
We cannot detect any particular pattern in the residuals series. There seems to 
be more volatility in the tariff series in Kenya and Tanzania than in the other countries. 
This could be due to imperfect data or other country specific factors. In any case, as a 
whole the plot shows that the model we estimated is a good fit. 
Now, since our estimations involve two different time periods, it becomes 
important to determine whether there occurs a structural break between the two 
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Figure 37. Graph of the residuals of the selected pre-agreement tariff model 
periods. The Chow test constitutes one method of testing for structural break between 
two periods. This test involves estimating a given model over a pooled sample, as well 
as the sub-samples, and then performing a F-test using the sum of squared residuals 
and the degree of freedom from the three estimations. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no structural break in the 
government's tariff setting policy between the pre-agreement period and the post-
agreement period. An F-statistic which is higher than the critical F-statistics would 
imply that we cannot accept the null hypothesis. 
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Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimation of our model over the post-
agreement period. Model TRFPSTl estimates the pre-agreement model, but without 
the pre-commitment tariff included. Other models are alternatives, with the pre-
commitment tariff included. 
For Model TRFPSTl, the is 0.95, and the is 0.48. The EXR and 
EXDTG variables have very low t-statistics: 0.66, and 0.22, respectively. The lagged-
Table 3. Post-agreement tariff model: testing the effect of the pre-commitment 
tariff 
Ofptf. v«r; TKF 
MoM TRPPST1 iMMtf TUfPSn MMtf TRFPSn MoM TRFPST4 
sund. 2-mil Sand. SandL 2-aff Sand. t-nu 
Vmiabtn CodK. emr i-tmt itettf. Cotll Cmr MMt» tianlf. Cotir. Kmr t-tomg a/anif. Coiff. Brer t-tui* 
Constant 0.120 0.030 3.400 0.001 0.020 0.060 0.440 0.660 0.033 0.060 0.540 0.580 
TRF{1} 0.600 0.090 6.710 0.000 0.540 0.090 5.660 0.000 0.540 0.090 5700 OOOO 0.540 0.090 5930 OOOO 
EXR 0.00002 000003 0660 0.510 0.000006 000002 0330 0730 
EXDTG 0.001 0004 0220 0.820 0001 0004 0400 0680 
TFFiPC 0450 0260 1.710 0090 0450 0250 1.810 0.070 0570 0131 4360 OOOO 
•OF: 44 
SSE=0.29 
|j;'°a9si 0.951 I/? = 0551 Iff* -a9s| 
=0.481 I/?" =0.501 =0.521 |j?'-O.Sg 
tariff, TRF{1} has a t-statistics of 6.71, and which is significant at the 1% level, and 
the constant's t-statistics is 3.40, also significant at the 1% level. The residuals of 
model TRFPSTl are graphed in Figure 38. 
Figure 38 shows that there is no discernible pattern in the residual series for 
any of the countries in the post-agreement period, with perhaps the exception 
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Figure 38. Graph of the residuals of the post-agreemeat tariff model. 
of Nigeria, where there seems to be a bit more volatility in the residual series than in 
the countries. We deduce from the plot that the selected post-agreement tariff 
model is valid. 
For the pooled regression, the and are 0.95 and 0.70, respectively. The 
variables EXR and EXDTG still have very low t-statistics: -0.48 and 0.25, 
respectively. The constant remains significant, with a t-statistics of 3.77, and a 
significance level of 1%, and the lagged-tarifif remains highly significant, with a 
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t-statistics of 14.90, which is significant at the 1% level (see Table 4). To carry out our 
test for structural stability, we use the following equation also known as the Chow test 
(ref RATS User's Manual); 
Ursspool-rssunr) / 4) (58) [rsspooH ndfiuir) 
where rsspool is the sum of squared residuals from the pooled regression (which does 
not include the pre-commitment tariflf variable), rssunr (the sum of the sum of squared 
residuals from the two sub-sample models) is the unrestricted sum of squared 
residuals, and ndfunr the degree of freedom of the unrestricted model. This is simply 
the sum of the degrees of freedom from the sub-sample models. The F-statistics, F(4, 
90), is 3.83, with a significance level of 0.0065. We therefore reject our null hypothesis, 
and conclude that Model TRFPR2 is not stable over the two sample periods. 
Table 4. The pooled tarifT regression 
Dep. Var; TRF 
Stand. 
Variables Coeff. Error t-stats Signif. 
Constant 0.076 0.020 3.775 0.000 
TRF{1} 0.788 0.053 14.897 0.000 
EXR -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.486 0.628 
EXDTG 0.001 0.004 0.255 0.799 
DOF: 94 
SSE: 0.58 
/?=0,95 
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The interpretation of the results of our test is that, in general, there seemed to 
have occurred a change in government tariff policy from the pre-agreement period to 
the post-agreement period. In our data the only difference between the two sub-
periods is the pre-commitment tariff that governments agreed to as part of SAP. 
Thus, we investigated whether including the pre-commitment tariff variable (TRFPC) 
in the post-agreement model affects the results obtained above. We call this new 
model. Model TRFPST2. We now present the results of its estimation (see Table 3). 
The and are 0.96 and 0.50, respectively. The constant term has a t-statistics of 
0.44, which is not significant; the EXR and EXDTG variables have t-statistics of 0.34 
and 0.40 respectively, and are also not significant. The lagged tariff have a t-statistics 
of 5.68 and is significant at the 1% level, and the t-statistics of the pre-commitment 
variable (TRFPC) is 1.71, which is significant at the 10% level. 
Excluding those variables with low significance level fi"om the model, results in 
a remarkable improvement in the pre-commitment variables, and a slight increase in 
the R^. Indeed, with this change, i.e., regressing tariff on the lagged tariff and the pre-
commitment tariff only, the t-statistic of the lagged tariff becomes 5.93 which is 
significant at the 1% level, and the t-statistics of the pre-commitment tariff increases to 
4.36, also significant at the 1%. Our results indicate that government tariff policy rule 
in the pre-agreement period breaks down in the post-agreement period. Further, 
changes in tariff in the post-agreement can be explained, mainly by the one-period lag 
of tariff and the pre-commitment tariff. One possible interpretation of our results is 
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that Afiican governments that signed agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions 
between the periods of 1980-1991, generally, but not perfectly, respected the portion 
of the agreements which related to tariff reforms. 
Now, given that the one-period lagged tariff seem to explain a significant 
portion of the tarifif series, we decided to investigate the possibility of a unit root in the 
tariff series. This is an important exercise since, despite the above results, we do not 
know precisely the structure of tariff policy rule in Afiican countries. For this exercise, 
we used the well-known Dickey-Fuller test. Following Enders (1995), we oflfer an 
explanation for this test. In general, assume a model of the form, y, = + e,. This 
model will be said to contain a unit root, if ai is equal to 1. To test this, we first 
subtract to obtain; A/, = 1) J,., + e,-, where, Aj, = {y, - >{_i). Let (a, -1) = ^. 
Then the model becomes; Aj, = +e,. To test the possibility of a model of random 
walk with a drift, we can add a constant term to obtain; Ay = a^+ + e,. Finally, 
the presence of a unit root can be tested by proposing the null hypothesis that y=0. 
The critical t-values are found in the tables developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
The inclusion of a drift term can also be tested using a simple t-statistic. We first 
estimated the random walk model over the pre-agreement period. The results are 
presented in Table 5. The t-statistic on the lagged tarifif is -1.30, with a significant level 
of 0.198. The critical values for the t-statistic at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are -1.61, 
-1.95, and -2.60 respectively. 
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We therefore cannot, at conventional significance levels, reject the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the tariff series during the pre-agreement 
period. The constant has a t-statistic of 2.08, significant at the 5% level. Thus, the 
tariff series, in the pre-agreement period, can be modeled as a unit root model with a 
drift. 
In the post-agreement period, the t-statistic on the one-period lagged tariff is -
4.43, significant at the 1% level. This leads us to reject the hypothesis of the presence 
of a unit root in the tariff series in the post-agreement period. One explanation for the 
behavior of the tariff series as a random walk in the pre-agreement period may relate 
to the possibility that there does not exist a systematic rule for setting tariff policy 
common to the Afiican countries under study. We do in fact test for this hypothesis 
(below) and find that there exists a significant difference in tariff policy depending on 
whether a country is member of the CFA (French-speaking) currency zone or not. 
Incidentally, when the same model is estimated over the pooled sample (Table 5), we 
Table 5. Testing Unit Roots in the TarifT Series 
Oapcf. Van TRFD 
Pn-tgmiL Post-tgrmt Poel»d R»g. 
Stand. 2'taU Stand. 2-tall Stand. 2-tall 
Variablaa Coaff. Error t-atata aiantt. Coaff. Error atgnlf. Coatf. Error t-atata aianff. 
Constant 0.03 0.01 2.08 0.04 0.12 0.03 3.87 0.00 0.06 0.01 3.84 0.00 
TRF{1} -0.07 0.05 -1.30 0.19 -0.40 0.08 -4.43 0.00 -0.19 0.04 -3.91 0.00 
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also reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
Note that these results confirm our earlier conclusions. Once again, we 
estimated a model that can be used as a possible explanation for tariff setting policy in 
the pre-agreement period. However, as before, this model fails to hold in the post-
agreement period, and the results of the test on the real efifect of the announced pre-
commitment tariff remain valid. 
3.4.2.2 The Results cf the Trade Model Assuming Common Effects 
Across Countries. 
The second portion of our empirical investigation consisted in estimating 
equation (55). The choice of the right hand side variables was based on past studies, 
as well as our own economic intuition. We view trade flows as reflecting production, 
and therefore investment in the trade sector of nations. Thus, as empirical studies have 
shown for the case of investment (see IFC, 1995), we believe that, in making their 
production and trade decisions, private agents take into consideration factors such as 
the existing capital stock (FXKG), credit availability, economic and currency stability, 
a country's general performance in its balance of payments accounts, performance in 
the public sector, country's income, and, if necessary, commercial policies. In our 
15. See for example, Ingco and Boko (1995), andBalassa (1990)In addition a macroeconomic model 
was developed by Quarcoo (1991) for the Ghanaian trade sector. Although the hypotheses tested in that 
model consisted in determining the role of e}qx>rt as an engine of growth, and the link between domestic 
credit expansion and external balances, we found some of the elements of the model to be useful for our 
stucfy. Ft^er, Joe Umo (1991) developed a trade model for Nigeria which focuses on import demand. 
Alechi NfBet (1991) presents a model on non-traditional exports in Cote d'lvoire. and Nehemiah 
M'geno's (1991) model focuses on the Kenyan export sector. Edward Leamer (1994) presents a survey of 
empirical testing for trade theory. See the bibliography for complete references. 
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model, we use the money supply (LMS) as a proxy for credit availability; currency 
stability is measured by the change in the exchange rate; the macroeconomic stability is 
captured by the inflation rate, proxied here by the change in the consumer price index 
(CPIC); we use the following to measure performance in the international sector the 
country foreign exchange reserve as a ratio of GDP (FREXCG), the current account 
balance, as a ratio of GDP (CACG), the external debt, as a ratio of GDP (EXDTG). 
We also use the gross domestic product (LGDP) to measure the country's income, 
and government deficit (expressed a ratio of GDP), as a measure of public sector 
performance. This variable is called GVDFG. 
But, more germane to this study, the objective is to determine how the 
announcement of trade reforms impacted private sector behavior. First, we estimate 
model (55), where we regressed the log trade flows on explanatory variables, including 
the ones cited above, the predicted tariff fi-om the earlier estimated tariff model 
(TRFPDPR), as well as the tariff equation residuals (RESIDSC), calculated as the 
difference between the predicted tariff and the actual tariff. The latter are included in 
order to determine whether the private sector finds the uncertain portion of 
government tariff policy to be more important to their decision than the tariffs 
themselves. Table 6 reports the results of the fiill model, and the corresponding 
residuals are graphed in Figure 39. 
The residual plot in Figure 39, as well as the of 0.99 and the of 0.97, 
together indicate that the regression is a very good fit. However, there remains 
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potential problems of multicoUinearity among the explanatory variables, since several 
of the variables have low t-statistics while the F-statistic of the regression is a high 
162.43. 
Exclusion of variables are made on both the basis of economic intuition, and 
examination of the correlation matrix for the all the explanatory variables. Table 7 
regresses the log of trade flows on the lagged trade flows, the predicted tarifl^ the 
tariflf regression residuals, the change in consumer price, the foreign exchange reserve. 
Table 6. Estimation of trade models in the pre-agreement period 
Depd.Var: LTRDFL 
Model 1 Model 2 
Stand. 2-taU Stand. 2-tall 
Variables Coeff. Error t-stats signif. Coeff. Error t-stats signif. 
Constant 0.170 0.520 0.330 0.740 0.240 0.370 0.650 0.530 
LTRDFL{1} 0.880 0.090 9.680 0.000 0.900 0.069 13.260 0.000 
RESIDSC 0.020 0.410 0.050 0.960 -0.055 0.410 -0.144 0.900 
TRDPDPR 0.100 0.200 0.500 0.620 0.055 0.210 0.270 0.790 
CPIC -0.001 0.001 -0.400 0.700 -0.001 0.001 -0.270 0.790 
FREXCG 3.083 2.170 1.770 0.080 3.260 1.700 1.940 0.060 
EXDTG -0.046 0.027 -1.710 0.098 -0.050 0.025 -1.930 0.063 
EXR 0.0004 0.0003 1.390 0.180 0.0004 0.0002 1.980 0.056 
LGDP -0.034 0.190 -0.190 0.860 -0.062 0.123 -0.510 0.620 
CACG -0.860 0.740 -1.150 0.260 
FXKG -0.550 0.810 -0.680 0.500 
DVDFG 0.140 0.290 0.470 0.640 
LMS 0.120 0.140 0.870 0.400 0.123 0.104 1.190 0.250 
7^=0.99 =0.99 
=0.97 1 W- =0.98[ 
106 
Table 7. The trade flows regression with 
tariff volatility and moving average 
Depd.Var LTRDFL 
Model 1 (With tariff volatility and MAV} 
Stand. 2-tall 
Varial}les Coetf. Error t-stats signif. 
Constant 0.360 0.390 0.920 0.370 
LTRDFL{1} 0.820 0.080 9.550 0.000 
TRFVOLAT -2.590 5.660 -0.460 0.650 
TRFMAV 0.034 0.210 0.150 0.880 
TRF 
TRF{1} 
CPIC -0.007 0.004 -1.880 0.060 
FREXCG 2.720 2.120 1.280 0.210 
EXDTG -0.030 0.030 -0.990 0.330 
EXR 0.001 0.0002 2.150 0.040 
LGDP 0.006 0.140 0.040 0.960 
LMS 0.140 0.110 1.310 0.190 
J^=Q.99 
'^^=0.98 
exchange rate, the log of GDP, the log of the money supply, and external debt. In this, 
as in the first regression, neither the predicted tariff, nor the tariff regression error 
seem to have any effect on the trade flows. Thus, before eliminating more variables, 
we explored the relationship between various measures of tariff effects [tariff volatility 
(TRFVOLAT), moving means of tariff (TRFMAV), the tariff in levels (TRF), lagged 
tariff (TRF (1} ] and trade flows. 
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Figure 39. Graph of the Residuals of the Full Pre-agreement Trade Model 
The choice of volatility of tariff was partly based on earlier studies, such as 
Lutz (1990), which investigated the relationship between output supply and price 
volatility. As Tables 7 and 8 show, none of the different measures of tariff effects 
seemed to impact private agents' behavior in the trade sector. One possible 
explanation for this result may concern the fact that, in addition to tariffs, many 
African government also maintain quotas, as well as other non-tariff barriers (NTB's) 
as a means to regulate the trade sector. This may explain why tariffs do not appear to 
affect private agents' decisions in the period before countries were required by 
international agreements to tarifiy their NTB's. 
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As a matter of fact, for the case of Nigeria for example, a 1994 World Bank 
study stated that^^; "until licensing was removed and exchange rate freed in 1986, the 
tariflf structure was not an important influence on levels of protection" (p 45). For 
Mali, the report stated that; "prior to reforms, [quantity restrictions] covered 58 goods 
or categories... In 1986, the import licensing system was reduced and simplified. Most 
monopolies were abolished in 1988, and quotas were removed on ten items which 
Table 8. Trade models with other tarifT measures 
Depd Var: LTRDFL 
Model 2 (mh tariff in level) Model 3 (With lagged tariff) 
Stand. 2-tail Stand. 2-tail 
Variables Coeff. Error t-stats signif. Coeff. Error t-stats signtf. 
Constant 0.330 0.320 1.040 0.300 0.230 0.350 0.670 0.510 
LTRDFL{1} 0.880 0.060 13.760 0.000 0.920 0.067 13.730 0.000 
TRFVOLAT 
TRFMAV 
TRF -0.016 0.160 -0.098 0.930 
TRF{1} 0.050 0.170 0.270 0.790 
CPIC 0.000 0.001 -0.260 0.790 0.000 0.002 -0.260 0.810 
FREXCG 4.160 1.320 3.160 0.002 3.260 1.660 1.970 0.050 
EXDTG -0.050 0.025 -1.930 0.063 -0.050 0.024 -1.960 0.050 
EXR 0.0004 0.0002 1.980 0.056 0.001 0.0003 2.080 0.044 
LGDP -0.090 0.100 -0.890 0.390 -0.062 0.120 -0.520 0.600 
LMS 0.180 0.090 1.990 0.051 0.120 0.100 1.190 0.230 
II o
 
III o
 
i/?^=0.98 /?^=0.98 
16. See Dean, Desai and Riedel (1994). 
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accounted for about 40% of imports." (p 44). For Kei^ it states; "quantity 
restrictions in the form of quotas and an extensive licensing system have been the 
major constraints on Kenya's trade throughout the 1980s." (p 42) For Cote d'lvoire 
we have; "the first stage of the program was implemented in 1985. [Quantity 
restrictions] and the reference prices were removed, the tariff structure was 
rationalized..." (p 40). For Senegal, "the objective of import liberalization was to 
abolish NTBs, eliminate special tariff regimes, and rationalize the tariff structure." (p 
46) There is strong evidence therefore both firom our case studies and other reports 
that non-tariff barriers, instead of tariffs themselves, remained the main trade revenue 
generating instruments for the countries we are studying in the pre-agreement period. 
Table 8 (above) presents the regression which includes tariffs in levels as an 
explanatory variable. After exclusion of all measures of tariffs, and exploration of 
various models, we selected one that regresses trade flows on a constant, the lagged 
trade flows, the one-period lag of inflation, the foreign exchange reserves (as a ratio of 
GDP), the log of money supply, the log of GDP, and external debt (as a ratio of GDP) 
as the best model to explain private behavior in the trade sector in the pre-agreement 
period. All parameters have the expected signs, and are significant, at least at the 10% 
level (see Table 9). The residual plot in Figure 40 indicates no pattern in the residuals 
series implying that the model fits very well. 
As Table 9 shows, the lagged trade, with a coefficient of 0.71, and a t-statistics 
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Table 9. The selected trade model in the pre-agreement period 
D9pd. Var: LTRDFL 
Model 1 Model 2 (wHh lagged Inflation) 
(whh inflation in level fom) 
S^d. 2'tall Stand. 2-tail 
Variables Coeff. Error t-stats signif. Coeff. Error t-stats signif. 
Constant 0.100 0.150 0.670 0.500 0.022 0.140 0.160 0.880 
LTRDFL{1} 0.770 0.050 15.670 0.000 0.720 0.044 16.240 0.000 
CPIC -0.003 0.001 -2.710 0.007 
CPIC{1} -0.005 0.001 -5.890 0.000 
FREXCG 2.660 0.570 4.680 0.000 2.580 0.510 5.050 0.000 
EXDTG -0.070 0.022 -3.190 0.002 -0.065 0.020 -3.370 0.001 
EXR 0.001 0.0002 2.790 0.006 0.180 0.058 3.060 0.002 
LGDP 0.127 0.063 2.020 0.040 0.180 0.060 3.110 0.002 
LMS 0.088 0.060 1.480 0.144 0.099 0.055 1.790 0.070 
1^=0.99 = 0.991 
I/?'=0.98 /?'=0.98 
SSE=2.8 
DOF=106 
of 16.23, appears to be a strong predictor of aggregate trade. Economic stability, 
(change in the CPI) negatively affects aggregate trade. The coeflBcient for this variable 
is -0.005, and the t-statistics is -5.88. Access to foreign exchange reserves, national 
income (GDP), and credit availability (money supply) are significant, positive 
predictors of aggregate trade, as we would expect. The foreign exchange coefficient is 
2.58, with a t-statistic of 5.05; the log of GDP has a coefficient of 0.17, with a t-
statistic of 3.11, and the log of money supply has a coefficient of 0.09, with a t-
I l l  
statistic of 1.79. I£gh external debt discourages trade, because it might force 
governments to increase trade revenues generating measures to service the debt. Thus, 
again we would expect a negative relationship between external debt and the level of 
aggregate trade. Indeed, in our estimation, the external debt coefiBcient is -0.065, with 
a t-statistic of-3.37. We kept the constant in the regression, even though it is not 
significant, to capture any other effects not explained by the other right hand side 
variables. The regression has an excellent fit, with an of 0.99, and an of 0.98. 
Once again, due to the strong explanatory power of the lagged trade variable, we test 
for the unit root in the trade series. The procedure is similar to the one employed for 
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Figure 40. The Residuals Plot of the Selected Pre-agreement Trade Model 
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the taiifif series above. The unit root test is based on regressing the differenced trade 
series on the lagged trade variable. 
The null hypothesis (presence of unit roots) is that the coefficient on the lagged 
trade variables is zero. When we include a constant, then we test for the presence of 
unit root with drift. Our results indicate that, in the pre-agreement period the 
coefficient on the lagged trade variable is -0.01, with a significance level of 0.46 (see 
Table 10). 
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the 
trade series. The drift (constant) term is also not significant. The results lead us to 
conclude that in the pre-agreement period the trade flows series seem to foUow a 
random walk pattern. In the post-agreement period, the lagged trade variable has 
coefficient of -0.13, which is significant at 10% level, leading us to conclude that there 
is some statistical evidence (not strong) to reject the hypothesis of unit root in the 
trade series in the post-agreement period. For the pooled regression, we were not able 
to reject the hypothesis of the presence of unit root in the trade series. As in the case 
of the tariflF model, we also tested, using the Chow procedure again, for structural 
break in the trade flow model over both the pre- and post-agreement periods. 
Table 11 reports the results of the pooled, and post-agreement regressions. 
The null hypothesis in this case is that there is no structural break over the two 
periods. A F-statistic which is higher that the critical F-statistic indicates that we 
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Table 10. Unit root tests in the trade series 
Depd. Van TRFLD 
Pn-Agreement Model 
Variabie Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 
TRDFL{1} 
193.913 126.641 
-0.014 0.020 
Post-Agreeement Mod  ^
1.531 
-0.737 
0.127 
0.462 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 
TRDFL{1} 
557.674 426.228 
-0.133 0.076 
1.308 
-1.746 
0.197 
0.088 
cannot accept the null hypothesis. 
For this study, the critical F-statistic, at the 5% significance level is 1.94, and 
the calculated F-statistics is 4.69, which is higher than the critical F. Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level, and conclude that we cannot statistically 
maintain that the model that explains the behavior of private agents in the trade sector 
in the pre-agreement period, remains the same in the post-agreement period. 
Next, we test whether the pre-commitment tariff had any real effect on the 
econometric model that we used to explain private agents' behavior in the post-
agreement period. First, given the failure of the pre-agreement model to hold in the 
post-agreement period, we estimated several alternative models, to determine one that 
best explains trade flows in the post-agreement period. The model we selected 
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regresses the log of trade flows on a constant, the one-period lag of trade, the log of 
money supply, and foreign exchange reserves (see Figure 41 for the graph of the 
residuals). 
The residual plot of the trade model in the post-agreement period (Figure 41) 
contrasts sharply with the same plot in the pre-agreement period. Indeed, in Figure 40, 
we observe large volatility in the trade residuals in almost all countries. In contrast, in 
Figure 41, the volatility in residuals is drastically reduced 
Table 11. The trade model: pooled and post-agreement regressions 
Depd. Var: LTRDFL 
The trade model in the 
post-agreement period The pooled trade model 
Stand. 2-tall Stand. 2-tail 
Variables Coeff. Error t-stats signif. Coeff. Error t-stats signlf. 
Constant -0.470 0.430 -1.100 0.280 0.100 0.136 0.770 0.440 
LTRDFL{1} 0.410 0.120 3.490 0.001 0.730 0.044 16.840 0.000 
CPIC{1} -0.001 0.002 -0.030 0.760 -0.005 0.001 -5.310 0.000 
FREXCG 0.600 1.020 0.590 0.570 2.090 0.450 4.700 0.000 
EXDTG 0.020 0.017 1.170 0.250 0.004 0.009 0.470 0.640 
EXR -0.0002 0.0001 -3.000 0.004 -0.0001 0.0001 -1.920 0.050 
LGDP 0.650 0.170 3.820 0.000 0.190 0.060 3.200 0.001 
LMS -0.080 0.140 -0.560 0.580 0.063 0.054 1.170 0.244 
7?^ =0.99 /?=0.99 
/?^=0.96 l/?^=0.97 
SSE = 1.5 SSE = 5.4 
DOF=40 DOF=154 
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for all countries except Nigeria and Senegal. We believe that this result lends support 
to the Chow and unit root tests which we have performed above, implying again that 
there is a structural break in the trade model from the pre-agreement period to the 
post-agreement period. 
In Table 12, we present the results of the selected post-agreement model. The 
lagged trade has a coefficient of 0.75, and a t-statistic of 7.31, the log of money supply 
has a coefficient of 0.22, and a t-statistic of 1.96, and the coefficient of the foreign 
exchange is 1.98, with a t-statistic of 2.09. The model has an of 0.99 and an of 
0 .95. Here as in the case of the pre-agreement model, we included the predicted tariff 
Time 
Figure 41. Graph of the residuals of the selected post-agreement trade model 
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and the residuals from the announced-tarifif-included-tariff model. The assumption 
again is that trade must be more responsive to anticipated as opposed to unanticipated 
changes in tariffs. All previous variables remain significant, and maintain the same 
sign. The coeflBcient of the predicted tariff is -0.69, with a t-statistics of 1.76, 
significant at the 10% level. But, the residual tariff (which captures the uncertainty in 
tariff policy) was not significant, as its coefficient is 0.04, t-statistic, only 0.09. 
Excluding the residual tariffs did not produce any significant impact on the regression 
results. Finally, the of the last model is 0.99, and 0.95. Thus, the pre-
commitment tariffs do have real effect of private agents' behavior in the trade sector, 
as explained by our model. 
Table 12. Testing the efTect of the pre>cominitinent tarilT 
Model 1: The selected Model 2: Effect of PC tariff Model 3: Effects 
Post-agreement model With Errors induded of PC Tanff w/o Brro/s 
Stand. 2-tail Stand. 2-tail Stand. 2-tail 
Variatjies Coeff. Error t-^ ats signff. Coeff. Error t-stats signif. Coeff. Error t-stats signif. 
Constant 0.344 0.250 1.390 0.180 0.680 0.310 2.190 0.030 0.680 0.310 2.220 0.033 
LTRDFL{1} 0.760 0.110 7.320 0.000 0.720 0.100 6.830 0.000 0.720 0.110 6.900 0.000 
LMS 0.220 0.120 1.970 0.050 0.250 0.120 2.250 0.030 0.260 0.120 2.280 0.030 
FREXCG 1.980 0.950 2.090 0.040 1.910 0.940 2.040 0.048 1.910 0.930 2.070 0.045 
TRFPDPS -0.700 0.400 -1.760 0.087 -0.700 0.390 -1.790 0.082 
RESIDSH 0.042 0.440 0.096 0.930 
= 0.991 ;?= 0.991 |y? =0.991 
= 0.951 i?"' =0.95i i;?'=0.95i 
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We find that in contrast to their behavior in the pre-agreement period, private 
agents included government tariff policy as a fector in their production and trade 
decisions in the post-agreement period. This may be an indication that the private 
sector lent some credence to government announcements of reforms in the 1980s (a 
formal pre-commitment test for announced policies is conducted below). Next, we 
reports the resuhs of the fixed effects models for tariffs and trade flows. 
3.4.2.3 The Results of the Fixed Effects Tariff Model 
The first model incorporates the same variables as the full model estimated 
above, with the following changes added. Since the countries we selected are different 
firom each other in terms of size (for example Nigeria has a population of over 100 
million, versus 6 million in Mali), we decided to form indices of those variables which 
had taken only the logarithmic values before. These include the trade flows, the GDP, 
and the money supply. In so doing the results become comparable across countries. 
For our indices we use 1985 (the year before adjustment programs took hold) as the 
base year. Further, we use the real exchange rate (REXR) instead of the nominal 
exchange in this and subsequent estimations. In addition, as per our discussion on 
fixed effects models, we incorporated dummy variables to capture specific country 
effects. With eight countries, we used seven dummy variables, taking Ghana as the 
baseline country whose effects are captured by the original constant term. Finally, we 
incorporated the terms of trade for each country in order to test the response of the 
tariff equation to changes in the terms of trade. Table 13 reports the results of the fiiU 
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fixed effects tariflf model. The for this model is 0.97, and the is 0.79. The 
results obtained in this first run indicate that three countries have tariff setting policies 
that are significantly different fi'om the situation in Ghana. Those countries include 
Kenya (5% significance level), Mali (10%), and Malawi (5%). 
Once again, using the t-statistics of variables and the correlation matrix, we 
eliminated several economic variables. We keep the dummy variables even if their t-
statistics are not significant, because this allows us to determine country-specific 
effects. The resulting model regresses tariff on a constant, the lagged tariff the real 
exchange rate, the index of GDP and country dummies. As Table 14 shows, the 
strongest response comes from the lagged tariff (coefBcient of 0.63, t-statistics 4.41), 
and very high significance level. Both the exchange rate and the GDP are significant at 
the 10% level. For this model, the countries whose effects are significantly different 
from Ghana are Tanzania (5%), and Malawi(5%). 
Considering the geographical location of the countries included in the model, 
this result is not surprising. Of the eight countries considered in the present study, five 
(Ghana, Cote dTvoire, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal) are located in West Africa, while 
the remaining three (Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi) are located in East Afiica. Because 
of geographical proximity, and inter-country alliances, there is more likely to be 
correlation among countries if they are located in the same region than otherwise. This 
argument does not however explain why Kenya was not significantly different from 
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Ghana in the above model, although the fact that both countries have the same British 
colonial legacy may be a &ctor. 
Next, we estimated the pre-agreement model in the post-agreement period to 
test whether there exists any changes in the results. Table 15 reports the results of this 
model. The above table provides some insightfiil results. First, the coefiBcient of the 
exchange rate has become negative in the post-agreement period, and is statically 
significant at the 5% level. This result concurs well with the provisions of the 
Table 13. The full fixed effects tariff model 
in the pre-agreement period 
Depd. Var: TRF 
Stand 
Variable Coeff Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant •0.029 0.310 -0.094 0.926 
TRF{1} 0.561 0.186 3.015 0.005 
TRDFLI{1} -0.001 0.001 -1.400 0.172 
TOTRD -0.001 0.001 -0.529 0.601 
GDPI 0.001 0.000 1.763 0.089 
GVEXPG -0.498 0.312 -1.596 0.121 
REXR 0.002 0.001 1.631 0.114 
KCHG -0227 0.512 -0.442 0.662 
EXDTG 0.003 0.100 0.034 0.973 
CACG -0.071 0.327 -0.216 0.831 
DUMMY(2) 0.280 0.132 2.116 0.043 
DUMMY(3) 0.198 0.122 1.626 0.115 
DUMMY(4) 0.194 0.111 1.740 0.093 
DUMMY(5) 0.316 0.138 2.293 0.029 
DUMMY(6) 0.526 0.388 1.355 0.186 
DUMMY(7) 0.282 0.184 1.530 0.137 
DUMMY(8) 0.132 0.109 1.202 0.239 
/^=0.97 
0.791 
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Table 14. The selected fixed effects tarifT 
modd in the pre-agreement period. 
Oflpcf. Var.: TRF 
Stand. 
VMable Coetf Error T-StatSfgnif 
Constant -0.170 0.167 -1.014 0.317 
TRF{1} 0.636 0.144 4.416 8E-05 
REXR 0.001 8E-04 1.781 0.083 
GDPI 6E-04 3E-04 1.704 0.097 
DUMMY(2) 0.121 0.082 1.474 0.149 
DUMMY(3) 0.056 0.066 0.844 0.404 
0UMMY(4) 0.086 0.073 1.186 0.243 
DUMMY(5) 0.161 0.082 1.973 0.056 
DUMMY(6) 0.221 0.090 2.441 0.019 
DUMMY(7) 0.102 0.075 1.373 0.178 
DUMMY(8) 0.049 0.080 0.609 0.546 
i?=0.97 
=0.80 
adjustment programs signed by African countries in the 1980s. 
Indeed, in an attempt to restore internal and external balance, a real 
devaluation of countries' exchange rate was required of most countries.'' Since in this 
study, exchange rate is expressed as the number of national currency units per one 
dollar, devaluation implies an increase in the exchange rate, while tariff reforms require 
a decrease in tariff rates. Thus, while in the pre-agreement the two variables may have 
changed in the same direction in many countries, they are forced to change in opposite 
17. The CFA zone countries maintained a fixed exchange rate, pegged to the French fianc until 1994 [see 
Clement (199S)]. Thus, devaluation did not ai^ly to the three French-speaking countries (Cote d'lvoire. 
Mali, and Senegal) in our studies. 
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Table 15. The post-agreement fixed effects 
tariff model 
Depd. Var. TRF 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signff 
Constant 0.397 0.160 2.482 0.018 
TRF{1} 0.372 0.130 2.855 0.007 
REXR -0.001 0.0004 -2.574 0.014 
GDPI 0.001 0.001 1.081 0.287 
DUMMY(2) -0.137 0.089 -1.543 0.131 
DUMMY(3) -0.128 0.084 -1.530 0.135 
DUMMY(4) -0.207 0.090 -2.310 0.027 
DUMMY(5) -0.191 0.095 -2.019 0.051 
DUMMY(6) 0.184 0.063 2.935 0.006 
DUMMY(7) 0.129 0.052 2.471 0.018 
DUMMY(8) -0.209 0.095 -2.199 0.034 
1/?^= 0.961 
^^=0.56 
direction as per the agreements. That the real exchange rate should be signijBcantly 
negatively related to tariff in the post-agreement period is indeed an indication that 
countries did attempt to follow through on their promises. 
Also, we find that the changes in Kenya and Cote d'lvoire were not 
significantly different fi-om the Ghanaian effect. Mali, and Malawi had tariff rates 
statistically significantly lower than Ghanaian tariffs, whereas tariff rates in Tanzania 
and Nigeria are statistically significantly higher than tariffs in Ghana. In order to test 
the effect of the precommitment tariff on actual tariffs we estimated the same model. 
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but with interaction terms replacing the simple country dummies. These interaction 
terms are called DUMPQ (for i = 2... 8) and are foimd as: 
DUMPCi = DUMMYfi) *TRFPC,fer (59) 
where, TRFPC is the pre-committed tariff. In addition to the interaction variables, we 
include the full vector of pre-commitment tariffs in the model. Thus, the null 
hypothesis that all countries are the same will hold true if the coefiBcients on the 
dummy variables are all zero. The results of this model are reported in Table 16. 
Given the t-statistics obtained in Table 16, we reject the null hypothesis that all 
countries behaved in the same manner in the post-agreement period. In &ct, while the 
results for Kenya and Cote d'lvoire were not significantly different from those of 
Ghana, we believe there is indication of significant policy reversal or late 
implementations Mali (implementation of tariff agreement did not begin until 1988. t-
statistics=-2.30), Malawi (t-statistics=-1.95), and Senegal (t-statistics=-2.01). Parallel 
to model TRFPST4 in Table 3, we examine the effect of excluding the constant and 
GDPI fi-om the fixed effect model. The results are reported in Table 17. 
The results that we obtained in Table 17 are parallel to those of model 
TRFPST4 in Table 3. The exclusion of the constant and the GDP variable greatly 
improves the significance of the pre-commitment tariff. Indeed, the coefficient of 
TRFPC went from 0.65 to 1.23, and the t-statistic rose from 1.067 to 2.59.This is 
another indication that the pre-commitment tariff had an impact on tariff setting policy. 
Continuing our attempt to test for any significant change in tariff policy between the 
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Table 16. The fixed effects model with 
interaction variables 
Depd.VanTRF 
Variable Coe/f Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 0.197 0.196 1.003 0.322 
TRF{1} 0.420 0.127 3.299 0.002 
REXR -0.001 0.000 -2.332 0.025 
GOPI 0.001 0.001 1.174 0.248 
TRFPC 0.649 0.608 1.067 0.293 
DUMPC2 -0.593 0.366 -1.621 0.114 
DUMPC3 -0.531 0.369 -1.439 0.159 
DUMPC4 -0.857 0.372 -2.306 0.027 
DUMPC5 -0.807 0.413 -1.951 0.059 
DUMPC6 0.401 0.279 1.436 0.160 
DUMPC7 0.476 0.241 1.976 0.056 
DUMPC8 -0.799 0.395 -2.020 0.051 
/^=Q.96 
pre- and post-agreement periods, we divided our sample up into two groups according 
to whether they belong to the CFA currency zone or have their own currency. In the 
African context, this amounts to a test of whether tariffs in French-speaking countries 
are generally different from those in English-speaking countries. The variable used to 
perform this test is CFADUM, which is 1 for countries in the CFA zone and zero 
otherwise. We present the results in Table 18. 
In the pre-agreement period, the variable CFADUM has a coefficient of -0.05 
and a t-statistics of -2.24, indicating that on average, tariff rates in French-speaking 
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Table 17. The fixed effects model with the exclusion of 
the constant and the GDP. 
DspcT. Van TRF 
Vaifibfe Com Std Error T-sm SIgnif 
TRF{1} 0.494 0.113 4.361 0.000 
REXR -0.0005 0.0003 -1.709 0.096 
TRFPC 1.234 0.477 2.589 0.014 
DUMPC2 -0.473 0.366 -1.293 0.204 
DUMPC3 -0.110 0.319 -0.344 0.733 
DUMPC4 -0.486 0.335 -1.452 0.155 
DUMPC5 -0.332 0.357 -0.930 0.358 
DUMPC6 -0.004 0.197 -0.020 0.984 
DUMPC7 0.184 0.196 0.937 0.355 
DUMPC8 -0.697 0.373 -1.866 0.070 
i/^=Q.96 
:^^=Q.52 
countries are lower than the rates in English-speaking countries, in the pre-reform 
period. This finding is supported by our stylized facts. For instance, the World Bank 
reports that in the pre-agreement period the average tariff rate was 26% in Cote 
d'lvoire, and 25% in Mali (both French-speaking), whereas in the English-speaking 
countries of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, average tariffs stood at 30%, 30%, 
35%, and 30%, respectively (Dean, Desai and Riedel, 1994). However, in the post-
reform period. Table 18 indicates that with a coeflBcient of -0.0039 and a t-statistics of 
0.90, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coeflScient on CFADUM in zero. 
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Table 18. The tarilT model with currency zone differentiation 
Depd Var.: TRF 
Model in Pre-agreemt Period Model in Post-agrctmt Period 
Variable Coetf Std Error T-Stat Signif Cotif Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 0.037 0.068 0.539 0.592 0.210 0.105 1.991 0.053 
TRF{1} 0.835 0.073 11.501 0.000 0.580 0.104 5.589 0.000 
REXR 0.0004 0.001 0.717 0.477 -0.0002 0.0002 -1.141 0.260 
GDPI 0.0001 0.0002 0.641 0.525 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.704 0.485 
CFADUM -0.052 0.023 -2.236 0.030 -0.004 0.030 -0.132 0.896 
Z?'=0.951 
=nvi 
This means that statistically, we cannot maintain the hypothesis that membership in the 
CFA zone makes an important difference in tariff policy in the post-reform period. 
This is not a surprising result since the agreements signed by countries during the early 
phase of structural adjustment programs contain more or less the same requirements. 
In the next section, we propose a methodology, based on the bootstrap 
approach, to test for the effect of pre-commitment tariff announcements on 
government policy. 
3.4.2.4 Testing for Pre-commitment Policies 
This test is based on the hypothesis that if policy announcements were adhered 
to, then we would predict that the government is less likely to alter its tariff policy in 
response to exogenous shocks in the post-announcement period than in the pre-
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announcement period. More specifically, the null hypothesis is that under pre-
commitment, the absolute value of the response coeflScient in the post-agreement 
period must be no larger than the absolute value of the response coefScient in the pre-
agreement period. The necessity of using absolute values in our calculation presented 
us with diflBculties in applying the usual asymptotic assumptions made in normal 
hypothesis testing. We therefore opted to use the bootstrap method to test our 
hypothesis for the cases of the real exchange rate and the GDP. Below is a sketch of 
the bootstrap technique utilized. 
3.4.2.5 The Bootstrap Technique 
Assume a general model of the form; 
where, Yt is the dependent variable, Xt is the exogenous variable, and St is the vector 
of residuals which may exhibit autocorrelation. The first part of the procedure is to fit 
model (60) saving the regression coefficients, the autocorrelation function (ACF) and 
the residuals. Using these results we construct a vector of residuals as; 
(60) 
e, = X- Y„ where'', (61) 
a 
18 The correlation coefficientPj is calculated as; p forj=l ...P, where P is the 
n 
maximum lag order, and n=sample size. 
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The second step is to draw, with replacement, a random sample (of size n) of 
residuals, called 8*, from the e series. Armed with e*, the regression coefficients, and 
the model from above, we then generate a bootstrap data, called Y* as; 
Y,=Y, + e]+p,e]., (62) 
The third step is to use from (62) to fit our original model, obtaining the 
bootstrap coefficients, say yff*. We repeated steps two and three 2000 times. 
Moreover, we applied the same methodology to both of our subsamples: the pre-
announcement sample and the post-announcement sample. And, for each run we 
calculate a parameter A* as: A* = |y^| - j^j where, P\ is the estimated bootstrap 
coefficient from the post-announcement sample, and is the estimated bootstrap 
coefficient from the pre-announcement sample. The histogram of A* will be used for 
the hypothesis testing in the next section. 
3.4.2.6 Testing the Null Hypothesis Based on the Percentile Interval 
The theoretical prediction is that, under pre-commitment, the response of the 
government policy to exogenous variations in economic conditions should be smaller 
in the post-announcement period than in the pre-announcement period. The null 
hypothesis to be tested then is; 
//o:|^2|<|>9i'|, or equivalently, //„: A* =|^|-|/7[|<0 (63) 
And, the alternative hypothesis is; //,: A* >0. (64) 
128 
To test the null hypothesis, we used the percentile approach to confidence 
interval calculation as proposed by Efiron and Tibshirani (1993). The procedure 
consists of the following. Given a selected significance level a, the 100*(l-a)% 
confidence interval for the bootstrap parameter A* (calculated fi'om some finite number 
B of bootstrap replications) is found by determining the lower bound of the interval, 
say , as the 100*ath empirical percentile of the Aj (b=l.. .B) values, and the 
upper bound of the interval, say as 100*(l-a)th empirical percentile of the 
A J values. Thus, with 2000 replications, and a=0.05, the lower bound of the 95% 
confidence interval is the 100*'' [(2000*0.05)*''] ordered value of the replications, and 
the upper bound of the interval is the 1900"' ordered value of the replications. For our 
purpose, we are only interested in the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval. 
Indeed, if the lower bound, A*^"^>0, meaning that the 95% confidence interval is to the 
right of zero, then we would reject the null hypothesis. Otherwise, we cannot reject 
the nuU hypothesis. Next, we present the test results.Table 19 shows different statistics 
on 2000 replications of our bootstrap statistics. 
We applied the bootstrap procedure to the fixed effects model using both the 
pre-announcement and post-announcement samples. The two exogenous economic 
variables in the model are the real exchange rate and the GDP. The variable DEXR is 
the calculated A* for the real exchange rate, and DGDP is the calculated A* for the 
GDP. In Figures 42-43 we plot the histograms of DEXR and DGDP. 
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We are now ready to test the null hypothesis. Following the procedure outlined 
above, we find the 5%"' empirical percentile of the DEXR values to be -0.00710, and 
the 5%"* empirical percentile of the DGDP values is -0.00860. Thus, the lower bound 
Table 19. Statistics for 2000 bootstrap replications of DEXR and DGDP 
NAME N MEAN ST.DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM COEF-OF-VARIATION 
DEXR 2000 -0.0048337 0.0053781 0.0000289 -0.040364 0.0062451 -1.1126 
DGDP 2000 -0.0029451 0.0040343 0.0000162 •0.016119 0.012741 -1J699 
value of the 95% confidence interval for both the DEXR and DGDP is less than zero, 
and we fail to reject the null hypothesis in each case. 
The above test results constitute rigorous evidence that the tariff and exchange 
rate reforms contained in the agreements signed by Afiican governments were (at least 
partially) adhered to in the period following the announcement. Note that, of the two 
variables tested, the exchange rate is the more interesting case. It is not directly related 
to tariflFs, but it enters into the expectations formation of agents. Thus, it is important 
for governments to follow the exchange rate policies that they have announced. 
However, the GDP is partially determined by the tariflF policy itself in Afiican 
countries, and thus, does not constitute an external (to the economy or to government 
instruments) economic factor to which government policies must respond. 
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Our next task is to test whether the models that we have used in our analysis 
are well specified. First, we test the tariif model. Later, we present the test results for 
the trade model. 
3.4.2.7 Tests of Spedficadon of the Tariff Model: the Hausman Approach 
In this section we test for the validity of our model specification. As should be 
clear firom our discussion on panel data, there are two modeling approaches that we 
can use in a panel data study; a fixed effect model and an error components or random 
effect model. The fixed effect model is extensively discussed in section 3.4.2.1. Here 
we present the alternative modeling approach: the random effect model. The model is; 
, where, consists of three components (this is why the random 
effect model is also called the error component model); a variable q- which reflects 
individual differences, a variable A, representing time specific differences, and a 
variable reflecting factors affecting both individual units and time periods. Thus, 
can be modeled as; - TJ- + /I, + The specification test becomes important when 
one considers the assumptions being made in these two approaches. 
The random effect model assimies that there is no correlation between the 
individual effects and the other regressors in the model, the fixed effect model assumes 
the opposite. We believe that due their geographical proximity, and the regional 
political, economic and cultural alliances''^  that exist between African countries, the 
19. Examples include: Ihe OAU. Uie ECOWAS, EAC, Ihe ADB. See Mazzeo (1984). 
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Figure 42. Histogram of 2000 bootstrap replications of the difference in the 
absolute value of the real exchange rate coefHcients from the pre- and post-
announcement periods. 
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0.226 451 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0J18 436 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.210 421 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.203 406 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.196 391 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.188 376 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.180 361 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.173 346 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.166 331 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.158 316 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.150 301 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.143 286 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.136 271 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.128 256 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.120 241 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.113 226 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.105 211 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.098 196 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.091 181 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.083 166 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.076 151 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.068 136 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.061 121 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.053 106 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.046 91 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.038 76 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.031 61 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.023 46 rxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
0.016 31 KXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.008 16 DCXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.001 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
I i-H—I r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
-0.0150 -0.011 -0.0086 -0.0069 -0.0029 0.00110.00512 0.0092 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.041 
Figure 43. Histogram of 2000 bootstrap replications of the difference in the 
absolute value of the GDP coefficients from the pre- and post-announcement 
periods. 
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fixed effects model is the more appropriate approach. 
To test for the orthogonality assumption made in the random effect model, 
Hausman (1978) devised a test based on the difference in the coef5cient vectors of the 
two models and the estimated covariance matrices. Assume that the error components 
(random effect) model is the true model. Then the coefBcients of the fixed effects 
would be inefScient. Let be the less efBcient (fixed effect) estimator, and be the 
random effect estimator (where both estimators are single coef&cients.) According to 
Hausman, if we assume that the random effect model is the true model, then the 
A A 
difference should be close to zero. The test statistic (based on the Wald 
criterion) is calculated as; 
This is a difficult matrix to compute, but according to Hausman "the covariance of an 
efficient estimator with its difference fi-om an inefficient estimator, is zero" (Greene, p 
479). Thus, the above matrix can be approximated as: 
(65) 
The covariance matrix in the denominator is found as: 
Vi 
-K) = var(yff ,)  +var(^,)+2Co»(y0„yffj)  (66) 
(67) 
and the test statistic is then found as: 
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var[A]+var[y0,] 
where k represents appropriate degrees of freedom. 
Applying this test to the tariff model, with the null hypothesis that the random 
effects model is the true model, our calculated W-statistic is: 13.002, with significance 
level equal to 0.0046. Therefore, we reject, even at the 1% level, the null hypothesis 
that individual effects are uncorrelated with other regressors, and maintain the fixed 
effect model as the more appropriate one for our study. 
3.4.2.8 Partial Conclusion on Tariff Policy in Africa 
With respect to tariff policy in African countries, the first part of this research 
produced results indicating that in general, there occurred a structural shift in tariff 
policy making in the eight Afiican countries that we selected. Furthermore, we 
discovered that incorporating the pre-commitment tariff variables into the tariff 
equation had a statistically significant impact on tariff policy in Afiica. Later, we 
conduct more detailed study to capture differences across countries. Using this fixed 
effects approach in panel data modeling, we were able to determine, distinctly what the 
policy effects of adjustment programs were in each country. We found out for 
example, that Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Cote d'ivoire and Kenya, tended to follow 
the tariff policy requirements of the adjustment programs, with the strongest effects 
occurring in Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania. Further, we discovered that there were 
significant reversals in Senegal, and Malawi, and late implementation in Mali, in 
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addition, our results indicate that there exists a significant difference in reform policies 
according to the country grouping based on colonial legacy. Incidentally, using the real 
exchange rate, our results confirm that the real devaluation of nations' currencies, 
which was a major part of the adjustment programs in Afiica, did in &ct take place. 
Our results are confirmed by the stylized &cts reported on each country. We now turn 
to the study of trade flows using the fixed effects model. 
3.4.3. The Fixed Effects Trade Model 
The second part of our inquiry is to determine private reactions to changes in 
nations' tariff policies. Once again, to account for differences in the sizes of 
economies, we used indices (the base year is 1985) of the following variables: the 
trade flows (TRDFLI), foreign exchange reserves (FREXCI), GDP (GDPI), and the 
money supply (MSI). In addition, here we used the real exchange rate instead of the 
nominal exchange rate, and we included the terms of trade to determine how trade 
flows respond to this variable. Similar to the estimation in Tables 9 and 11, we first 
present the fiiU model Table 20, then Table 21 will report the selected model. 
The results of this first estimation indicate that with an of 0.64, and several 
insignificant variables, the model could be improved upon. After several trials, the best 
fixed effects trade model that we selected to predict trade flows is reported in Table 
21. 
With the exclusion of insignificant variables, we did not observe a significant 
change in the which had a slight drop fi-om 0.97 to 0.96. In contrast there was a 
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significant increase in the which increased fi'om 0.64 to 0.88 indicating an 
improvement in the model. The model regresses the trade flows on a constant, the lag 
of trade flows, the one-period lag of inflation, and the foreign exchange reserves plus 
country dimmiy variables.^ All economic variables have the expected signs. Trade 
flows are negatively related to inflation instability, but respond positively to the level 
of available foreign exchange reserves, and their one-period lag. All economic 
variables are significant at least at the 10% level. Two variables, the lagged trade flows 
and inflation are significant at the S% level. In addition, we note that while all 
countries' trade sector seemed to have performed worse than the Ghanaian trade 
sector, the differences are not significant, except in Cote d'lvoire. 
As before, we test the trade model in the post-agreement period. First, we run 
the model with the country dummies only, then we test the model with interaction 
terms between country dummies and the precommitment tariff. The results of this 
estimation are reported in Table 22. 
The results show that the trade sectors in Tanzania and Nigeria performed 
significantly worse than the Ghanaian sector in the post-agreement period, although 
the significance of the Tanzanian dummy is only 10%. When, the interaction terms are 
included, Nigeria becomes the only country whose trade sector performs statistically 
significantly worse than the Ghanaian trade sector. 
20. Note that the terms of trade did not significantly afiect the trade flows in our stucfy. 
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As we did for the case of the tariff model, we test whether location in the CFA 
currency zone is a significant predictor of trade flows in Afiican nations. Table 23 
shows, that the coefBcient of CFADUM is negative in both periods, however, we fail 
to reject the hypothesis that this variable is zero in both periods. We would infer from 
the results in Table 23 that (CFA) currency zone location is not a statistically 
important predictor of private trade decisions in Afiican nations. This result lends 
support to the expectation that, regardless of their respective countries, private agents. 
Table 20. The fuD fixed effects trade model 
in the pre-agreement period 
DepdVar:TRDFU 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 57.106 39.621 1.441 0.156 
TRDFLK1} 0.551 0.129 4.254 0.000 
CPIC{1} -0.575 0.177 -3.244 0.002 
TOTRD -0.033 0.197 -0.169 0.867 
FREXCI 0.002 0.003 0.629 0.533 
REXR 0.120 0.165 0.727 0.471 
GDPI -0.203 0.178 -1.140 0.260 
MSI 0.270 0.148 1.825 0.075 
EXDTG -0.358 12.010 -0.030 0.976 
DUMMY(2) -17.589 25.159 -0.699 0.488 
DUMMY(3) -26.006 22.152 -1.174 0.247 
DUMMY(4) -22.867 22.239 -1.028 0.309 
DUMMY(5) -24.896 23.135 -1.076 0.288 
DUMMY(6) -18.247 18.514 -0.986 0.330 
DUMMY(7) -0.375 35.120 -0.011 0.992 
DUMMY(8) -27.622 21.627 -1.277 0.208 
0.971 
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Table 21. The selected fixed effects trade model 
in the pre-agreement period. 
Depd. Var: TRDFU 
Variatte Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 14.802 4.939 2.997 0.003 
TRDFLI{1} 0.950 0.034 28.221 0.000 
CPIC{1} -0.203 0.088 -2.311 0.022 
FREXCI 0.004 0.002 1.919 0.057 
DUMMY(2) -6.079 5.410 -1.124 0.263 
DUMMY(3) -12.456 6.133 -2.031 0.044 
DUMMY(4) -4.913 5.635 -0.872 0.385 
DUMMY{5) -11.147 8.793 -1.268 0.207 
DUMMY(6) -4.116 5.302 -0.776 0.439 
DUMMY(7) -6.164 5.141 -1.199 0.233 
DUMMY(8) -6.163 5.669 -1.087 0.279 
1^=0.96 
/g'=0.88 
Table 22. The Fixed Effects Trade Model in the Post-agreement Period with and 
without interaction terms 
Depd. Var: TRDFU Dpd. Var.: TRDFU 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signlf Variable Coeff Std Error TStat Signif 
Constant 61.873 25.085 2.467 0.018 Constant 56.90 25.06 227 0.03 
TRDFU{1} 0.595 0.160 3.726 0.001 TRDFU{1} 0.62 0.16 3.87 0.00 
CPIC{1} 0.115 0.310 0.370 0.713 CPIC{1} 0.13 0.32 0.41 0.68 
FREXCI 0.014 0.009 1.485 0.146 FREXCI 0.01 0.01 1.43 0.16 
DUMMY(2) -11.834 13.134 -0.901 0.373 DUMPC2 -29.39 42.22 -0.70 0.49 
DUMMY(3) -21.806 14.847 -1.469 0.150 DUMPC3 -87.52 68.84 -1.27 0.21 
DUMMY(4) -6.846 16.085 -0.426 0.673 DUMPC4 -17.69 65.09 -0.27 0.79 
DUMMY(5) 3.514 12.404 0.283 0.779 DUMPC5 25.32 56.54 0.45 0.66 
DUMMY{6) -24.693 13.946 -1.771 0.085 DUMPC6 -75.42 48.33 -1.56 0.13 
DUMMY(7) -39.216 16.683 -2351 0.024 DUMPC7 -156.45 72.28 -2.16 0.04 
DUMMY(8) -14.797 14.756 -1.003 0.322 DUMPC8 -32.49 40.13 -0.81 0.42 
TRFPC 198.63 175.85 1.12 0.266 
1/^=0.97 
\R^=Q.69 
Ft=osn 
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&ced with the same circumstances (we forced the model to be the same for all 
countries in our study), will tend to make decision based on the same rational 
considerations. Thus, we would not expect differences in private behavior for agents 
facing the same set of variables. 
To determine whether there has occurred an increase in trade between the two 
periods, we estimate the pooled model with a time dummy variable called TIMEDUM 
included. This variable takes on the value of 1 for the period 1986-1991, and zero 
otherwise. The results of this model are reported in Table 24. The variable TIMEDUM 
is importam because it helps to test the following hypothesis. Trade reforms (tariff 
reductions and elimination or reduction of non-tariff trade barriers), when credible, are 
Table 23. Testing the Effect of CFA Zone Location in both Pre- and Post 
Agreement Periods 
Depd. Van TRDFLI Depd. Var.: TRDFLI 
Testing the Effect of CFA Zone Testing ttte Effect of CFA Zone 
Location in Pre-agreement Period Location in Pos^agreement Period 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif Variaiile Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signlf 
Constant 9.373 2.738 3.424 0.001 Constant 13.68 14.21 0.96 0.34 
TRDFU{1} 0.950 0.033 29.005 0.000 TRDFU{1} 0.92 0.11 8.39 0.00 
CPIC{1} -0.149 0.078 -1.922 0.057 CPIC{1} 0.08 026 028 0.78 
FREXCI 0.002 0.002 1.343 0.181 FREXCI 0.01 0.01 1.27 021 
CFADUM -2.253 2.906 -0.775 0.440 CFADUM -3.17 8.37 -0.38 0.71 
/?=0.96 i?=0.97 
i;?*=0.87 =0.661 
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Table 24. Testing for Inter-period 
Differences in the Volume of Trade 
Depd. Var.: TRDFU 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signlf 
Constant 15.984 4.884 3.273 0.001 
TRDFLI{1} 0.925 0.032 28.707 0.000 
CPIC{1} -0.154 0.083 -1.853 0.066 
FREXCI 0.004 0.002 2.221 0.028 
DUMMY(2) -6.554 5.081 -1.290 0.199 
DUMMY(3) -13.475 5.600 -2.406 0.017 
DUMMY(4) -4.324 5.343 -0.809 0.419 
DUMMY(5) 1.101 6.543 0.168 0.867 
DUMMY(6) -4.408 4.879 -0.904 0.367 
DUMMY(7) -7.916 4.873 -1.624 0.106 
DUMMY(8) -7.454 5.342 -1.395 0.165 
TIMEDUM 6.287 3.124 2.012 0.046 
/g'=Q.97' 
7^=0.87 
supposed to spur the volume of trade in the periods following the announcement of the 
reforms, i.e., the trade sector of a country that is engaged credible trade reforms would 
be predicted to become more open. If this hypothesis holds, then the time dimimy 
should be positive and statistically significantly different from zero. Indeed, as Table 
24 shows, we can reject the hypothesis that TIMEDUM is equal to zero at the 5% 
significance level. Thus, it appears that overall, for the time periods and countries 
under study, private agents responded positively to reforms in Afiican countries. We 
now present the results of the specification test for the trade model. 
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3.4.3.1 Specification Tat for the Trade Model 
The same Hausman specification test that we utilized in the case of the tariff 
model was applied to the trade model. The issue once again, is to determine whether 
our specification of a fixed effects model for trade in Afiica was valid in the context of 
our panel data approach as opposed to a random effects model. The same W-statistic 
that we derived above applies here. Our calculated W-statistic is 9.605, with 
significance level equal 0.022. Thus, we can, based on strong statistical evidence 
(2.5% significance level), reject the null hypothesis that trade flows in this study 
should be modeled as a random effects model. Put differently, we reject the hypothesis 
that there exists no correlation between country specific effects and other regressors in 
the trade model. As we have explained before, this results is well expected in the 
context of Afiica due to the many trade and other economic ties that exist among the 
countries in the different regions of the continent. 
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4. CONCXUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Overall, from an econometric standpoint, we have found the following results; 
the best models that we can use to predict both government tariff setting policy and 
private agents' behavior in African countries in the pre-adjustment period, fail to hold 
to in the post-adjustment period. Holding everything else constant, the main difference 
(of interest to this study) between the two periods is the policy commitments made by 
governments as part of their international agreements. Our results indicate that, with 
respect to tariff policy, African governments, in general, respected their commitments. 
Further, private agents appear to have found the international agreements to be 
credible, and seemed to have modified their production and trade decisions to include 
tariff policy as an elemem of their planning. We could therefore state that the 
Structural Adjustment Programs, with regard to their provision for tariff reduction, 
served their purpose as a precommitment mechanism in African countries. 
The "real world" applications of these results must be conducted with care. 
First, structural adjustment programs became prevalent only in the 1980s, and with our 
data available only up to 1991, we did not have a long period to study the effects of 
policy changes in Africa. We remedied this problem somewhat by adopting a panel 
data approach in out study. Further, our data on tariffs, for the most part, were 
calculated by us, from data on tariff revenues in Africa countries. And, in the absence 
of a tariff reduction schedule for the pre-commitment tariff we assumed that from a 
base year, tariffs would be reduced in equal proportion up to their new level f^eed to 
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by governments. Thus, one area of possible improvement on this study is to obtain 
better data on tarifif policy and policy changes in Africa. 
Another area of improvement regards broadening the scope of this study to 
include countries from other regions, and to countries which did not sign agreements 
to determine how those countries performed during the same time period we 
considered, and compare the results to the ones obtained in this study. This is difficult 
to apply in the African context, because virtually every country in Africa has 
undertaken some type of structural adjustment program. Indeed, a 1992 World Bank 
report indicates that during the 1980-89 period, there were only eight African 
countries (out of fifty one) which did not receive adjustment loans. Those countries 
include; Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda. 
However, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, and Egypt have since joined the group of 
adjusting countries. Algeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda are either in the midst of 
civil strife, or have been ravaged by one so that it is not possible to obtained 
meaningfril data from those countries. 
With respect to our theoretical presentation, fiirther areas of interest include 
studying the effects of the introduction of real uncertainty into the model, and the 
investigation of other kinds of pre-commitment mechanisms, especially as they relate 
to the political economy of countries. 
Finally, ours was not a study of the welfare effects or the failure or success of 
structural adjustment programs in Africa. Many studies, including several World 
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Bank's own assessments have found adjustment policies to have mixed results in 
Africa (e.g.. World Bank, 1989). And, in a recent article in the magazine. The 
Economist, Jeffiey Sachs pronounced the Bretton Woods institutions' policies in 
Africa to be a failure, although salvageable {The Economist, June 1995). But, the 
questions posed in our thesis are much narrower than the success and failure of 
adjustment programs in Africa. We sought to find out whether international 
agreements, and more specifically, the provisions for tariff policy changes in those 
agreements, could serve as a pre-commitment mechanism in the relationship between 
the private sector and the government in Afiican countries. 
The statistical evidence suggests that in the presence of an international 
"arbiter" the private sector seems to hold some credibility towards the government in 
Africa. However, the stylized evidence shows that it is difficult for governments to 
implement reforms which may change the status quo for sectors which hold powerful 
political influence in the concerned country. Nevertheless, based on our theoretical 
discussion, and our empirical results, we recommend that, for those Afiican 
governments which are concerned about their relationships with the private sector, an 
adoption of some kind of mechanism (international agreements, constitutional laws, 
etc....) that would irrevocably commit governments to their policy announcements 
could serve to raise the private sector's confidence in government policies. However, 
any such mechanism must have its foundation in the political, social and cultural 
realities of each country. 
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where; 
and. 
dO 
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF ^ ^<0 
Consider the utility function (3); 
U=U{C„,G) 
c„ = ^<2,;£) = (3,+(?,(i-r)P" 
H 
(A.1) 
(A.2) 
G='^tP-Q; = HTP-Q, (A.3) 
Then, under pre-commitment, the &st order condition to the maximization of (A. 1) 
subject to (A.2) and (A.3) is: 
Total differentiation of (A.4) gives rise to: 
( Uj)dQ, + P\Ua-U,)dr + Tr[AdC^ + BdG] = 0 
(A.4) 
(A.5) 
where. 
dC = m -tP^^dQ-P^Q,dT 
^ . 
dG= [HT P^dQ^ + HP^Q^dz] 
A=U(j^ t/i, > 0, if G is a normal good 
(A.6) 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
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and. 
UoG < 0, if Cm is a normal good. (A.9) 
Using (A.5)-(A.9) we obtain: 
uj +{TP')'UA^+H^ dQ. 
= ^ P'(-U^ + U,)^r[P')'[AQ,- BHQS\dz 
(A. 10) 
Define; 
Z= U,g*{zP'f\-A^+HB\ (A.I1) 
Under our assumptions, (including normality), we have Z < 0. 
Thus, 
dQ. P'fQ.jA- BH)] 
dx 
(A. 12) 
Now, define Q, = Then we make use of the first order conditions for the 
' dx 
government welfare maximization in equation (23) and obtain: 
(A.13) 
which implies that. 
6i-{/„ = (//-1) (A.14) 
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Substituting (A. 14) into (A. 12) we obtain; 
<?,= A.15 
Define; 
S= P^(//-l)U^ + r(P'')\A-B//)Q 
and. 
(A. 16) 
Thus, (A. 15) can be rewritten as: 
' z 
which implies that: 
a 1-^ 
z 
s 
z 
Finally, we can solve for the variable of interest as: 
S Qr = 
Z - K  
(A. 17) 
(A 18) 
(A19) 
(A.20) 
Under our assumptions, K>0, S>0 and Z<0. TTierefore we obtain the desired result 
that: -^<0. QED. 
dx 
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APPENDK B: LIST OF VARIABLES 
TRF Annualized ^gregate tariff rate 
TRFPC Precommitment tariff announced 
LTRDFL Log of trade tiows (Imports + Exports) 
TRDFLI Index of trade flows (1985 base year) 
GVEXPG Government expenditures, expressed as a ratio of GDP 
EXR Nominal exchange rate 
REXR Real exchange rate 
LGDP Log of GDP 
GDPI Index of GDP (1985 base year) 
KCHG Change in the Capital Stock (Investment) as a ratio of GDP 
EXDTG Total External Debt as a ratio of GDP 
CACG The Current Account Balance, as a ratio of GDP 
CPIC Change in Consumer Price Index 
FREXCG Foreign Exchange Reserves as a ratio of GDP 
FREXCI Index of foreign exchange (1985 base year) 
FXKG Fixed Capital Stock as a ratio of GDP 
GVDFG Government budget deficit as a ratio of GDP 
LMS Log of money supply 
MSI Index of the money supply (1985 base year) 
TRFPDPR Predicted Tariff in pre-agreement period 
RESIDSC Residuals of Tariff Model in pre-agreement period 
TRFPDPS Predicted tariff in post-agreement period 
RESIDSH Residuals of Tariff Model in Post-agreement period 
TRFVOLAT Volatility in tariff series 
TRFMAV Moving average in tariff series 
TOTRD Terms of trade 
TIMDUM Time dummy 
CFADUM CFAzone dummy 
DUMPCi Interaction dummy variable for country i 
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